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One	  of	  the	  most	  debated	  questions	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  public	  bureaucracies	  is	  whether	  their	  formal,	  
impersonal	  rules	  of	  decision	  endow	  them	  (rightly	  or	  not)	  with	  relative	  autonomy	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  special	  
interests.	  We	  study	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  French	  Bureau	  du	  Commerce:	  a	  small,	  
high-­‐skill,	   rather	  modern	   agency	   in	   charge	   i.a.	   of	   handing	   out	   franchises	   and	   benefits	   to	   private	  
entrepreneurs.	  Decision-­‐making	  relied	  on	  a	  mix	  of	  hierarchic	  division	  of	  labor,	  intense	  collection	  of	  
grass-­‐root	   information,	   consultations	   with	   experts	   and	   collegial	   decision	   making	   by	   high-­‐level	  
technocrats.	   The	   key	   elements	   of	   every	   submission	   and	   deliberations	   were	   coded	   for	   the	   period	  
between	  1724	  and	  1744.	  We	  show	  that	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  key	  participants	  in	  the	  procedure	  (for	  or	  
against	  each	  demand),	  and	  the	  qualitative	  arguments	  they	  brought	  forward	  are	  robust	  predictors	  
of	  the	  final	  decision.	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  receive	  support,	  the	  parties	  had	  to	  play	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  
Bureau,	  in	  terms	  of	  aligning	  their	  projects	  with	  its	  revealed	  policy	  preferences.	  	  	  
.	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1.	  Bureaucracies	  and	  Interest	  Representation	  
Whereas	   the	   concept	   of	   state-­‐building	   evokes	   grand	   notions	   like	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   civic	  participation	   or	   constitutional	   commitments,	   how	   state	   bureaucracies	   contribute	   to	   such	  endeavors	   and	   how	   they	   are	   actually	   built	   up	   are	   generally	   seen	   as	   secondary	   questions.	   In	  practice,	   bureaucracies	   seem	   to	   attract	   the	   attention	  of	   social	   researchers	   only	  when	   they	   are	  dysfunctional	  or	  corrupt,	  or	  when	  they	  escape	  the	  control	  of	  their	  principals;	  that	  is,	  when	  they	  diverge	  from	  Max	  Weber’s	  classical	  criteria	  of	  expertise,	  hierarchy	  and	  impersonality.	  	  
What	   is	   often	   missed	   from	   the	   old	   Weberian	   text	   is	   that,	   although	   Weber	   announces	   that	  bureaucracies	  will	  eventually	  perform	  like	  ideal	  instruments,	  he	  envisages	  them	  also	  as	  a	  force	  for	  change:	  a	  historic	  social	  phenomenon	  that	  has	  considerably	  affected	  how	  modern	  societies	  work	   and	   how	   they	   are	   governed.	   In	  Weber’s	   view,	   the	   expansion	   of	   bureaucracies	   since	   the	  early-­‐modern	   period	   is	   a	   core	   feature	   of	   the	   more	   general	   development	   of	   impersonal,	   law-­‐based	   states	   (or	   Rechtsstaat).	   By	   transferring	   administrative	   duties	   from	   “personal	   trustees,	  
table-­‐companions,	   or	   court-­‐servants”	   (Weber;	   1978,	   II,	   p.	   956)	   to	   specialized,	   permanent	  organizations,	   the	   rulers	   gained	   considerable	   power,	   both	   within	   their	   countries	   and	   against	  their	   neighbors.	   To	   Weber,	   the	   close	   historical	   and	   theoretical	   connection	   between	   the	  impersonal	   character	   of	   bureaucracies	   and	   that	   of	  market	   exchanges	  was	   critical:	   predictable	  rule-­‐making	   and	   rule	   enforcement	   allow	   for	   a	   superior	   “calculability”	   of	   microeconomic	  decisions	  and,	  by	  extension,	  with	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  a	  higher	  capacity	  for	  economic	  agents	  to	  optimize	  resource	  mobilization.	  
This	  idealized	  type	  of	  bureaucratic	  model	  has	  often	  been	  associated	  with	  the	  traditional	  ethos	  of	  the	  French	  bureaucracy,	  or	  that	  of	  the	  Second	  German	  Reich,	  which	  were	  founded	  on	  a	  principle	  of	   relative	   autonomy	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   special	   interests.	   In	   this	   view,	   States	   and	   governments	   should	  serve	   a	   broader	   understanding	   of	   the	   public	   good	   than	   what	   the	   addition	   of	   ad-­‐hoc	   interest	  coalitions	  would	  warrant,	  and	  if	  necessary	  they	  should	  assume	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ultimate	  agents	  of	  change.	  Theories	  of	  “modernization”	  during	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  have,	  for	  instance,	  underlined	  the	  role	  of	  partially	  authoritarian,	  bureaucratic	  states	  in	  overcoming	  sectorial	  or	  communitarian	  divisions	  (Rosenberg,	  1958;	  Ward	  and	  Rustow,	  1964).	  More	  recently,	  the	  literature	  on	  economic	  development	  in	  East	  Asia	  has	  also	  emphasized	  that	  relatively	  autonomous	  bureaucracies	  can	  act	  as	   a	   coordinator	   of	   private	   interests,	   thanks	   to	   a	   time	  horizon	   that	   extends	  beyond	   the	   short-­‐term	   view	   of	   most	   economic	   agents	   (Amsden,	   1989;	   Wade,	   1990;	   Rodrick,	   1997).	   The	  counterargument	  defends	  the	  position	  that	  partially	  autonomous	  bureaucracies	  only	  signal	  that,	  in	   practice,	   the	   state	   has	   become	   despotic	   and	   possibly	   oppressive.	   From	   this	   perspective,	  bureaucrats	  should	  be	  subjected	  to	  absolute	  heteronomy,	  or	  capture,	  so	  that	  the	  responsibility	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for	  balancing	  interests	  is	  left	  to	  a	  hopefully	  constitutional	  political	  process,	  where	  citizens	  have	  political	  agency.	   If	   the	  regime	   is	   illiberal,	   then	  bureaucracies	  should	  be	  expected	   to	   implement	  the	  distribution	  of	  rents,	  as	  agreed	  among	  fractions	  of	  the	  dominant	  elites.	  	  
This	  article	  does	  not	  defend	  a	  normative	  view	  of	  what	  bureaucracies	  should	  do.	  Rather,	  it	  raises	  the	   anterior	   question	   of	   a	   bureaucracy	   being	   designed	   by	   policy-­‐makers	   as	   an	   autonomous	  organization	  to	  help	  them	  reach	  their	  policy	  objectives.	  We	  explore	  the	  specific	  experience	  of	  the	  
Bureau	   du	   Commerce,	   a	   rather	   modern	   agency,	   with	   some	   15-­‐20	   high-­‐skill	   technocrats,	   that	  operated	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  unwieldy,	  despotic	  monarchy	  that	  governed	  France	  under	  the	  Ancien	  
Régime.	  The	  question	  we	  ask	  is	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  small	  bureaucracy	  was	  able,	  by	  the	  virtue	  of	  its	  own	  procedural	  rules,	  to	  shape	  policy	  decisions	  in	  a	  consistent,	  means-­‐end	  oriented	  manner.	  Alternately,	   if	   the	   Bureau	   du	   Commerce	   was	   entirely	   dominated	   by	   rent-­‐seeking	   politics,	   its	  formal	  rules	  would	  not	  leave	  their	  mark	  on	  decisions.	  	  
In	  practice,	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  Bureau	  covered	  the	  key	  planks	  of	  the	  mercantilist	  project:	  a	  set	  of	  “development	   policies,”	   whose	   goal	   was	   to	   revamp	   the	   economy	   against	   the	   resistance	   of	  backward-­‐looking	   interests	   and	   so	   to	   support	   economic	   catch-­‐up	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   England	   and	   the	  Netherlands.	   There	   is	   little	   doubt	   that	   the	   King’s	   men,	   who	   built	   and	   staffed	   the	   Bureau	  perceived	  very	  well	  that	  the	  key	  risk	  —	  in	  a	  regime	  with	  no	  Parliamentary	  or	  media	  oversight	  —was	  outright	  capture	  by	  rent-­‐seeking	   interests,	  both	  at	  the	  center	  (the	  Versailles	  Court)	  and	  in	  the	  provinces	  and	  the	  cities.	  As	  argued	  by	  Szulman	  (2011)	  in	  the	  case	  of	  canals,	  decisions	  issued	  by	   the	   bureaucracy	  might	   have	   been	  made	   at	   a	   higher	   level	   in	   the	   governmental	   machinery,	  possibly	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  power	  games	  between	  cliques	  and	  coteries.	  This	  would	  support	   the	  even	  more	  radical	  analysis	  of	  Ekelund	  and	  Tollison	  (1981,	  1989),	  or	  Root	  (1994),	  who	  see	  the	  18th	   century	   state	  machinery	   as	   a	   grand	   rent-­‐extracting	   organization,	   whose	   only	   aim	  was	   to	  maintain	  social	  control	  and	  consolidate	  the	  power	  of	  the	  monarchy.	  	  
The	  response	  of	  policy-­‐makers	  to	  this	  obvious	  threat	  took	  the	  form	  of	  a	  specific	  decision-­‐making	  procedure:	   Rather	   than	   being	   based	   on	   insulation	   and	   hyper-­‐centralization,	   relative	  bureaucratic	   ability	   to	   govern	   and	  meet	   the	   rulers’	   objectives	  would	   draw	   on	   the	   capacity	   to	  collect	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  private	  information	  and	  organize	  discussions	  within	  fora	  that	  worked	  on	  a	  collegial	  basis.	  Classical,	  hierarchic	  lines	  of	  reporting	  and	  decision-­‐making	  were	  thus	  carefully	  coordinated	   with	   more	   expertise-­‐based,	   horizontal	   mechanisms	   of	   deliberation	   where	   open,	  rational	  argumentation	  could	  take	  place.	  Hypothetically,	  this	  was	  where	  a	  notion	  of	  public	  good	  (essentially	  articulated	  in	  an	  industrial	  or	  local	  development	  policy)	  could	  actually	  emerge.	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The	  question	  we	  ask,	  therefore,	  is	  whether,	  against	  the	  odds,	  its	  rules	  and	  procedures	  endowed	  the	  Bureau	  with	  a	  capacity	  to	  act	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  change,	  or	  whether	  its	  de	  jure	  constitution	  was	  de	  
facto	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  pressure	  of	  a	   thoroughly	  rent-­‐seeking	  environment.	  We	  analyze	   the	  case	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	   privilèges,	   i.e.	   individual	   franchises	   and	   rents,	   to	   private	  entrepreneurs.	   Policy	   implementation	   responded	   to	   a	   bottom-­‐up	   process	   whereby	   each	  applicant	  sent	  his	  demand	  to	  the	  Bureau	  in	  Paris,	  which	  then	  investigated	  the	  case	  and	  decided	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  support	  him.	  Thanks	  to	  well-­‐kept	  archives,	  we	  have	  been	  able	  to	  code	  all	  281	  individual	  applications	  that	  were	  received	  and	  processed	  between	  1724	  and	  1744.	  We	  identified	  the	   conclusions	   reached,	   the	   parties	   and	   experts	   involved	   in	   each	   case,	   and	   the	   qualitative	  arguments	  leveraged	  by	  each	  of	  them.	  Hence,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  test	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  whether	  the	   final	  outcomes	  were	  determined	  by	  the	  procedure.	  We	  show	  that,	   indeed,	  decisions	   issued	  by	   the	  Bureau	   are	   correlated	   to	   the	   positions	   expressed	   by	   the	   key	   voices	   in	   the	   deliberation	  process	   (for	   or	   against	   each	   submission)	   and	   by	   the	   substantive	   arguments	   that	   they	   raised	  
within	   the	  procedure.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   competing	   positions	   of	   the	   various	   voices	   and	   their	  motives	  are	  significant	  predictors	  of	  the	  final	  decisions.	  Broad	  or	  impersonal	  criteria	  that	  shaped	  the	   distribution	   of	   rents	   to	   private	  manufacturers	   can	   thus	   be	   observed	   ex	  post.	  The	   fact	   that	  they	  remain	  stable	  for	  a	  period	  of	  20	  years	  suggests	  that	  the	  mix	  of	  hierarchic	  division	  of	  labor,	  information	   gathering,	   and	   collegial	   deliberation	   actually	   supported	   a	   rather	   consistent	  development	  policy.	  
We	  start	  by	  reviewing	  the	  debate	  on	  how	  modern	  bureaucracies	  should	  be	  shaped	  and	  framed	  to	  be	  powerful	  tools	  of	  governance	  of	  societies	  and	  economies,	  without	  threatening	  the	  dynamic	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  (Section	  2).	  We	  then	  present	  in	  greater	  detail	  the	  investigated	  case:	  the	  Bureau	  du	  Commerce	  (Section	  3).	  We	  point	  out	  specifically	  how	  different	  stakeholders	  and	   experts	   were	   involved	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   Section	   4	   details	   our	   sources	   and	  data.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  provide	  early	  insights	  that	  decision-­‐making	  aimed	  more	  at	  reaching	  a	  consensus	  among	  experts	  than	  a	  compromise	  among	  conflicting	  stakeholders.	  This	  is	  confirmed	  by	  an	  econometric	  analysis	  that	  sheds	  more	  light	  on	  the	  collegial	  character	  of	  decision-­‐making	  at	  the	  Bureau	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  deliberation	  (Section	  5).	  Concluding	  comments	  follow	  (Section	  6).1	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1In order to make reading easier we do not rely on precise historic French terms regarding, for instance, the 
State’s nomenklatura: and the arcane aspects of bureaucratic gears. An appendix available upon request offers 
contextual details on the Bureau and the State Machinery of 18th century France. 
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2.	  The	  Dilemma	  of	  Modern	  Bureaucracies	  	  
2.1.	  The	  Weberian	  Paradigm	  
When	  Max	  Weber	  described	  modern	  bureaucracies	  as	  pure	  instruments,	  or	  as	  social	  machines,	  he	  stressed	  that	  he	  did	  not	  describe	  the	  actual	  administrative	  organizations	  of	  his	  time.	  In	  fact,	  he	   explicitly	   defended	   a	   teleological	   perspective:	   Eventually,	   bureaucrats	   will	   behave	   like	  automats	   and	   satisfy	   the	   formal	   expectations	   that	   are	   built	   into	   the	   design	   of	   today’s	  bureaucracies.	  They	  will	  be	  recruited	  and	  promoted	  on	  the	  exclusive	  basis	  of	  merit;	  the	  division	  of	   labor	   will	   be	   minutely	   regulated;	   their	   allegiance	   will	   increasingly	   go	   to	   the	   bureaucratic	  process	   per	   se	   rather	   than	   to	   cliques	   or	   to	   successive	   governments.	   In	   turn,	   these	   emerging	  patterns	   explain	   in	   Weber’s	   perspective	   the	   seemingly	   irresistible	   expansion	   of	   impersonal	  bureaucracies	  and	  their	  resilience	  to	  social	  and	  political	  crises.	  
Against	   this	   classic	   view2,	   standard	   Public	   Choice	   approaches	   typically	   frame	   parliamentary	  democracy	   as	   a	   continuing	   bargaining	   game	  between	   competing	   social	   interests.	   The	   claim	   to	  relative	   autonomy	   by	   state	   bureaucracies	   is	   then	   seen	   as	   a	   signal	   of	   evasion	   from	   citizens’	  control,	  hence	  of	  policy	  capture:	  Oppression	  might	  thus	  be	  around	  the	  corner	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  this	  unique	   interest	  group	  which	  should	  have	  no	  public	  voice	   (Buchanan	  and	  Tullock,	  1962).	   In	  an	  influential	  article,	  McCubbins	  et	  al.	   (1987)	  asked	  how	  bureaucracies	  should	  be	  shaped	  so	  as	  to	  thwart	   autonomy.	   They	   come	   up	   with	   two	   broad	   messages.3	  First,	   ex	   post	   monitoring	   and	  sanction	  of	  bureaucracies	  is	  typically	  costly	  and	  prone	  to	  failure;	  hence,	  ex	  ante	  strategies	  should	  be	  preferred,	  whereby	  politicians	  take	  control	  of	  the	  design,	  recruitment	  and	  procedural	  rules	  of	  the	  agency	  at	  inception.	  Second,	  the	  best	  way	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  this	  agency	  will	  not	  escape	  from	  its	  mandate	   is	   that	   the	  special	   interests	   that	  were	  at	   the	  origin	  of	   the	  policy	   innovation,	  at	   the	  onset,	   remain	   closely	   associated	   with	   policy	   implementation	   after	   the	   politicians	   have	  withdrawn.	  Hence,	  politicians	  should	  “stack	  the	  deck”	  at	  the	  agency	  with	  these	  interest	  groups.	  Because	   the	   latter	   have	   a	   strong	   interest	   in	   successful	   implementation,	   they	  will	  mobilize	   the	  resources	  needed	  to	  do	  the	  monitoring.	  Hence,	  actual	  policy-­‐making	  will	  reflect	  the	  politicians’	  original	   vote,	   even	   though	   they	   don’t	   check	   in	   detail	   how	   it	   is	   implemented.	   At	  worst,	   special	  interests	  will	  “sound	  the	  alarm”	  if	  the	  agency	  runs	  amok.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Meier and O’ Toole (2006) for a recent restatement; see West (2005) for a review of the literature,   
3 See also McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), Weingast (1984) and Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast (1987).  
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2.2.	  Agencies	  vs.	  Colleges	  	  
A	  further	  twist	  in	  this	  debate	  came	  from	  de	  Figueiredo	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  who	  potentially	  restored	  a	  more	  substantial	  definition	  of	  the	  common	  good	  than	  that	  accommodated	  by	  the	  Public	  Choice	  orthodoxy.	   Rather	   than	   focusing	   on	   Parliament	   and	   re-­‐discussing	   constitutional	   issues	   of	  representation	  and	  vote,	  they	  look	  at	  information	  flows	  ex	  post.	  Whereas	  McCubbins	  et	  al.	  argue	  in	  essence	  that	  these	  flows	  should	  derive	  from,	  and	  will	  then	  serve,	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  dominant	  interest	   coalition,	   de	   Figueiredo	   et	   al.	   advocate	   that	   officials	   actually	   open	   the	   door	   to	   many	  different	   interest	   groups,	   including	  minority	   ones,	   and	   thus	  maximize	   their	   total	   information.4	  From	   there	   on,	   rather	   than	   being	   the	   docile,	   executive	   arm	   of	   majoritarian	   social	   coalitions,	  bureaucrats	   would	   regain	   a	   self-­‐standing	   capacity	   to	   debate	   policy	   matters,	   make	   informed	  judgments	   and	   strike	   trade-­‐offs	   between	   competing	   claims.	  On	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	   they	  may	  thus	  defend	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  minority	  rather	  than	  of	  a	  majority	  coalition,	  or	  open	  access	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  public	  good.	  
This	   proposition	   is	   particularly	   appealing	   when	   considering	   the	   case	   of	   an	   illiberal	   regime,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  established,	  rule-­‐based	  arena	  in	  which	  interest	  groups	  can	  bargain	  on	  policies	  and	  convey	  to	  politicians	  their	  private	  information.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  constitutional	  checks	  and	  balances	   and	   established	   channels	   of	   consultation,	   the	   bureaucracy	   may	   become	   entirely	  insulated	   from	   society.	   Even	   with	   the	   best	   technical	   expertise	   and	   the	   strongest	   internal	  procedures,	  policies	  may	  be	  found	  to	  be	  irrelevant,	  capricious,	  or	  captured	  by	  the	  interests	  that	  are	  closest	  to	  it,	  for	  instance,	  the	  protégés	  and	  the	  favorites	  at	  the	  Versailles	  court.	  De	  Figueiredo	  
et	   al.	   propose	   an	   alternate	   perspective	   and	   suggest	   that	   bureaucracies	   can	   co-­‐opt	   divergent	  interests	  within	  their	  decision	  process	  and	  so	  avoid	  the	  risk	  of	  outright	  capture.	  	  
Interestingly,	  Max	  Weber	  also	  had	  a	  proposition	  along	  these	  lines.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  his	  chapter	  on	  bureaucracy,	   he	   briefly	   discusses	   the	   case	   of	   “collegial	   bodies”	   that	   can	   inform	   or	   influence	  policy-­‐makers	   from	   the	   outside	   (Waters,	   1989,	   1993;	   Weber,	   1977).	   The	   main	   examples	   he	  mentions	  belong	  to	  the	  period	  of	  emergence	  of	  modern	  states	  and	  present,	  in	  his	  understanding,	  an	   archaic	   character	   (like	   assemblies	   of	   great	   aristocrats).	   But	   he	   also	   mentions	   “advisory	  colleges,”	  made	  of	  experts,	   that	   first	   emerged	  as	   technical	   aids	   to	   the	  early	  modern	  monarchs,	  primarily	   in	  matters	   of	   finance	   and	   taxation.	   They	   then	   became	   permanent	   fixtures	   alongside	  modern	   bureaucracies	   and	   governments.	   The	   point	   is	   that	   they	   retained	   organizational	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “ … when considering the relationship between interest groups participation and ex post inducements, political 
officials are always better off with multiple interest groups participating. (…)”  “In this sense, while the political 
principal is biased in what policies she prefers, she is neutral with respect to information: more is better and less 
is worse, irrespective of the message.”(de Figueiredo et al., 1999) 
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characteristics	   that	  are	   clearly	  distinct	   from	   those	  of	  paradigmatic	  bureaucracies,	   though	  both	  serve	   the	   government.	   Weber	   mentions	   here	   that	   recruitment	   within	   colleges	   is	   based	  exclusively	  on	  expertise:	  Members	   interact	  on	  an	  equal	  basis,	   i.e.,	  between	  peers;	   they	   tend	   to	  decide	   either	   by	   vote	   or	   by	   consensus;	   colleges	   are	   also	   typically	   neutral	   and	   politically	   non-­‐aligned,	   so	   that	   they	   have	   nothing	   in	   common	   with	   democratic,	   representative	   institutions.	  Lastly,	  they	  are	  “primarily	  intended	  to	  promote	  objectivity	  and	  integrity	  and	  to	  this	  end	  to	  limit	  the	  
power	  of	  individuals.”	  (ibid,	  I,	  p.280).	  Therefore,	  their	  main	  effect	  is	  to	  increase	  “thoroughness	  in	  
the	  weighing	  of	  administrative	  decisions”	  (ibid,	  I,	  p.277).	  	  
Out	   of	   these	   basic	   constituent	   features,	   a	   great	   number	   of	   variants	   have	   been	   identified	   and	  analyzed,	   primarily	   by	   political	   scientists	   and	   sociologists.	   Here	   again,	   expertise,	   mutual	  recognition	   and	   self-­‐regulation	   govern	   these	   colleges	   internally,	  while	   allowing	   them	   to	   enter	  into	  structured	   interactions	  with	  policy-­‐makers	  or	  bureaucrats	   (Lazega	  2001).	  One	  example	   is	  the	  epistemic	  communities,	  as	  defined	  by	  Haas	  (1992):	  They	  emerge	  out	  of	  a	  scientific	  academic	  profession	  and	  try	  to	  influence	  policy-­‐makers	  in	  a	  given	  policy	  field.	  In	  many	  international	  fora,	  the	  latter	  then	  explicitly	  endorse	  the	  experts’	   internal	  rules	  of	  deliberation	  and	  validation,	  and,	  in	   so	   doing,	   they	   also	   credit	   their	   collective	   knowledge	   with	   a	   degree	   of	   political	   legitimacy.	  Another	   example	   is	   the	   case	   of	   central	   banks	   and	   international	   courts,	   which	   have	   been	  characterized,	   respectively	   by	   Majone	   (2001)	   and	   Alter	   (2008),	   as	   “trustees,”	   which	   these	  authors	   neatly	   contrast	   with	   agents. 5 	  When	   challenged	   by	   governments,	   for	   instance,	  international	   judges	  or	  central	  bankers	   typically	   invoke	   their	   independence,	  arguing	   that	   their	  legitimacy	   and	   capacity	   to	   fulfill	   their	  mandate	   rests	   on	   functional	   autonomy	   and	   asking	   that	  their	   self-­‐regulated	   expertise,	   judgment	   and	   deliberation	   rules	   be	   vouchsafed.	   They	   will	   also	  tend	  to	  argue	  that	  they	  do	  not	  serve	  their	  principals,	  but	  a	  third-­‐party,	  like	  aggrieved	  citizens	  or	  the	  common	  good.	  These	  examples	  confirm	  that	  expert	  colleges	  are	  actually	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  modern	  bureaucracies,	  especially	  in	  a	  context	  like	  the	  international	  arena	  where	  formal	  political	  channels	  of	  representation	  are	  not	  available.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 On central banks, Majone cites Rogoff (1985) as an inspiration.  
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3.	  The	  Bureau	  du	  Commerce	  and	  its	  decision-­‐making	  process6	  
We	  now	  proceed	  with	  describing	  the	  broad	  structure	  of	  the	  financial	  bureaucracy	  of	  the	  Ancien	  
Régime,	   before	   shifting	   to	   the	   Bureau	   du	   Commerce,	   which	   was	   one	   of	   its	   most	   remarkable	  agencies.	  	  
3.1.	  Economic	  Policy-­‐Making	  under	  the	  Ancien	  Régime	  and	  the	  Rationale	  for	  
Privilèges	  	  
France	   under	   the	   Ancien	   Régime	   was	   primarily	   characterized	   by	   its	   intense	   institutional	   and	  legal	   fragmentation.	   Peasants,	   merchants,	   or	   aristocrats	   did	   not	   have	   rights	   in	   the	   modern,	  impersonal	  sense:	  Their	  individual	  franchise	  was	  primarily	  defined	  by	  their	  belonging	  to	  status	  groups.	  Furthermore,	  the	  legal	  fragmentation	  was	  also	  geographical:	  Civil	   life	  was	  regulated	  by	  65	   coutumes	   générales	   and	   300	   other	   coutumes	   locales,	   which	   were	   all	   enforced	   by	   the	   local	  courts,	   and	  ultimately	   by	   the	  14	   regional	   appellate	   courts.	  Most	   economic	   activities	  were	   also	  regulated,	   typically	   by	   municipalities	   or	   guilds.	   The	   major	   implication	   with	   regard	   to	   policy-­‐making	  was	  that	  the	  room	  for	  across-­‐the-­‐board,	  impersonal	  policies,	  which	  would	  have	  affected	  all	  agents	  in	  a	  symmetrical	  way,	  was	  very	  limited.	  The	  King	  could	  wield	  extreme,	  possibly	  lethal	  powers	   against	   specific	   agents,	   who	   could	   be	   sent	   to	   the	   Bastille	   or	   invited	   to	   Versailles.	  Similarly,	   he	   could	   spend	   resources	   and	  project	   physical	   force,	   for	   instance,	   by	  building	   roads	  and	   canals,	   or	   by	   repressing	   rural	   uprisings.	   But	   the	   State	   had	   a	   most	   limited	   capacity	   to	  influence	   decentralized	   behaviors	   in	   general	   (Brousseau	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   In	   other	   words,	   the	  sovereign	   did	   not	   “govern	   society”	   or	   the	   economy	   as	   a	  whole,	  whether	   one	   thinks	   of	  market	  transactions	   or	   collective	   behaviors	   affecting	   public	   health,	   the	   environment	   or	   technical	  innovations.	   Hence	   this	   key	   corollary:	   Policy	   implementation	  was	   ultimately	   a	   retail,	   case-­‐by-­‐case	  affair.	  	  
This	   institutional	   (and	  cognitive)	   constraint	   is	  ultimately	   reflected	   in	   the	  way	   the	  bureaucracy	  interacted	  with	  individual	  economic	  agents.	  As	  it	  tried	  to	  affect	  their	  behaviors,	  it	  mobilized	  the	  only	  available	   legal	   instrument	  at	   its	  disposal:	  privilèges,	   that	   is,	  an	  ad	  hoc	  unilateral	  decree	  by	  the	  King,	  which	  details	  a	   specific	  package	  of	   franchises	  and	  benefits.7	  The	   implementation	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6We restrict ourselves to the information necessary for understanding our case study. Historic details are 
provided in an appendix of this paper availlable upon request. In particular, we give information on the 
variations that affected the Bureau du Commerce and its procedure over time. Here we describe the process as it 
was organized from 1724 to 1744. 
7 Privilèges were not limited to case-by-case support to entrepreneurs, however, they were a generic legal 
instrument that was used to formalize virtually any type of franchise, including straight-forward rents to cronies, 
the statutes of guilds, or the specific benefits that the King granted to cities or provinces.  
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consistent	   policy	   that	  would	   affect	   agents	   across	   the	  whole	   kingdom	   in	   a	   rather	   homogenous	  way	  was	  therefore	  a	  serious	  challenge	  to	  the	  bureaucracy.	  While	  acting	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  it	  would	  have	  to	  find	  procedures	  and	  rules	  that	  would	  preserve	  unity	  of	  direction	  across	  tens	  or	  hundreds	   of	   individual	   cases.	   How	   the	   bureaucracy	   reconciled	   (or	   not)	   such	   general	   or	  impersonal	  aims	  with	  its	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  individual	  decisions	  is,	   in	  essence,	  what	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  assess	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  
3.2.	  The	  Contrôle	  Général	  des	  Finances:	  An	  Emerging	  Modern	  Bureaucracy	  
From	  the	  ascent	  of	  Louis	  XIV	   to	   the	   throne	   in	  1661,	  and	  until	   the	  death	  of	  his	  most	   influential	  minister,	   Colbert	   (1683),	   the	   attempt	   to	   reform	   and	   rationalize	   the	   state	  machinery	   centered	  primarily	   on	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Finance	   (known	   as	  Contrôle	  Général	  des	  Finances).8	  Beyond	   fiscal	  and	   budgetary	   affairs,	   which	  were	   its	   core	   responsibility,	   it	   had	   oversight	   of	   a	   large	   array	   of	  issues	   that	   included,	   among	   other	   things,	   commercial	   law	   and	   jurisdictions,	   the	   regulation	   of	  guilds	  and	  professions,	  and	  support	  to	  private	  manufactures.	  Since	  then,	  this	  ministry	  has	  been	  seen	   in	   the	   literature	   as	   the	  main	   place	  where	  modern	   bureaucratic	   structures	   and	   practices	  emerged	   in	   France.	   It	   gradually	   developed	   an	   early	   body	   of	   civil	   servants9	  and,	   significantly,	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  provinces,	   it	  did	  not	  want	  to	  rely	  upon	  the	  traditional	   line	  of	  seigniorial	  allegiance,	  so	  it	  built	  its	  own	  network	  of	  local	  offices	  and	  officials:	  the	  provincial	  Intendants.	  	  
Still,	   the	   modern	   character	   of	   this	   administration	   should	   not	   be	   overstated.	   Patronage	   and	  corruption	   were	   widespread	   and	   considered	   to	   some	   extent	   as	   normal.	   (Bossenga,	   1991;	  Campbell,	   1996;	   Kettering,	   1986;	   Mousnier,	   1982)	   Many	   positions	   in	   the	   local	   and	   central	  bureaucracy	  were	  farmed	  out,	  thus	  they	  would	  not	  entail	  a	  direct	  hierarchic	  relation	  or	  an	  easy	  capacity	   to	   organize	   the	   bureaucratic	   work	   around	   impersonal	   principles.10	  Top	   bureaucrats	  directly	  hired	  a	  large	  part	  of	  their	  own	  staff:	  Hence	  they	  empowered	  their	  staff,	  rather	  than	  being	  empowered	  by	  them.	  Another	  important	  feature	  of	  this	  bureaucracy	  was	  its	  very	  small	  size.	  Felix	  (1997)	  estimates	   that	   the	  headquarters	  of	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  in	  Paris	  had	  a	  staff	  of	  about	  100–110	   persons	   by	   the	   1770s,	   and	   around	   150	   by	   1789;	   the	   local	   network	   in	   the	   provinces	  would	  have	  totaled	  some	  540	  people	  by	  mid-­‐century.	  Within	  this	  total,	  the	  Bureau	  du	  Commerce,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Within the large literature on the Ministry of Finance under the Ancien Régime one may consult, for instance, 
Antoine (1973 and 2003), Boscher (1970) and Richet (1973).  
9 The commis were the ones who cared for well-kept files, who recorded the correspondence with local 
administrators, and made a whole career at the Ministry while developing an ethos of neutrality and merit 
(Monnier, 1997; Felix, 1997; Antoine, 2003). 
10 On the specific dimension of the administrative work, the recruitment and the division of labor at the Ministry 
of Finance, see Bosher (1964) and Monnier (2003); on the commis as the real embryo of modern bureaucrats, 
Baxter (1980) and Felix (1997). Also Barbiche (2003), who asks rhetorically “what we don’t know about the 
Contrôle”, and then points that its decision-making process has not been much explored. On the development 
more generally of early modern bureaucracies is Reinhard (1996) and Descimon (1996) 
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which	  was	   in	   charge	  of	   commerce	  and	   supply-­‐side	  policies,	  had	  a	  body	  of	  15	   to	  20	  high-­‐skills	  experts	  and	  bureaucrats,	  plus	  a	  number	  of	  secretaries.	  	  
3.3.	  A	  Group	  of	  Top	  Bureaucrats	  and	  Merchants	  
Between	  1700	  and	  1790	   the	  Bureau	  du	  Commerce	  worked	  within	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  as	  a	  somewhat	   autonomous	   agency,	   endowed	  with	  well-­‐identifiable,	   rather	   stable,	   procedures.11	  At	  least	  during	   the	   first	  half	  of	   the	  century,	   there	  are	  suggestions	   that	  early	  modern	  bureaucratic	  patterns	  were	  more	  developed	  at	  the	  Bureau	  du	  Commerce	  than	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Ministry.	  	  
One	  specific	  trait	  of	  the	  Bureau	  was	  that	  deliberation	  proceeded	  through	  two	  colleges.	  First	  were	  the	  Députés	   du	   Commerce:	   a	   group	   of	   10	   to	   14	   well-­‐established,	   experienced	  merchants	   who	  were	   partly	   elected	   from	   the	   largest	   trading	   cities	   and	   partly	   co-­‐opted	   from	   the	   central	  bureaucracy.	  Some	  had	  a	  more	  or	   less	  extensive	  experience	  of	   civil	   service,	  and	  most	  of	   them,	  before	   joining	   the	   Bureau,	   had	   a	   long	   background	   either	   in	   municipal	   government	   or	   in	   the	  traders’	   courts.	   Their	   typical	   background	   was	   long-­‐distance	   trade,	   shipping,	   banking	   and,	  occasionally,	  slave	  trading.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  belonged	  to	  a	  class	  of	  powerful	  private	  interests	  that	   generally	   operated	   outside	   the	   guilds	   and	   across	   the	   closed,	   highly	   regulated	  markets	   of	  those	  days.	  As	  merchants,	  they	  also	  had	  a	  good	  knowledge	  of	  existing	  technologies	  and	  products,	  market	   practices	   (including	   the	   old	  Merchant	   Law),	   and	   the	   economic	   geography	   of	   both	   the	  kingdom	  and	  foreign	  countries.	  	  	  
The	   Députés	   were	   expected	   to	   contribute	   as	   both	   experts	   in	   commercial	   affairs	   and	   as	  representatives	   of	   their	   city	   of	   origin,	   though	   in	   practice	   the	   first	   mandate	   became	   the	   most	  important.	   The	   sustained	   flows	   of	   correspondence,	  memoranda	   and	   briefs	   between	   cities	   and	  their	  Députés	  reflect	  indeed	  a	  lot	  of	  dissatisfaction,	  if	  not	  frustration,	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  municipal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The literature on the Bureau is not very extensive. Early studies, of good quality, have been published by 
Hutteau d’Ottigny (1857), Biollay (1885), Bonnassieux (1900), and Wybo (1936). During the second half of the 
twentieth century the discussion on the Bureau became very much a part of the broader dispute on French 
mercantilism after Colbert and the possible resistance against his legacy. One of the best references on the early 
years of the Bureau is Schaeper (1983), who covers its first fifteen years of existence, and offers, among other 
things, a detailed description of its internal working, division of labor, staffing, etc. Another series of 
publications then look at the two last decades of the Bureau, before the Revolution, see Parker (1979). Minard 
(1998) presents a comprehensive review on the control of manufacturers and the corps of Inspecteurs des 
manufactures: He thus covers the monitoring and enforcement dimension that immediately comes after the 
granting of the privilèges. On the distribution of privilèges, see also Bondois (1933).  
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authorities	   and	   the	   chambers	  of	   commerce.	   Some	  cities	   even	   stopped	   supporting	   them	  during	  some	  periods	  and	  had	  to	  be	  called	  to	  order.12	  	  
Working	   rules	   among	   the	   Députés	   tend	   to	   confirm	   the	   relative	   weakness	   of	   the	   agency	  relationship	  and,	  by	  comparison,	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  collegial	  and	  advisory	  dimension.	  First,	  each	  policy	   issue,	   or	   individual	   decision,	   was	   discussed	   collectively,	   on	   a	   peer	   basis,	   without	   any	  formal	   hierarchic	   relationship	   among	   members	   of	   the	   group.	   In	   the	   large	   majority	   of	   cases,	  conclusions	  drawn	  were	  conveyed	  to	  the	  bureaucrats	  as	  a	  consensus	  view	  that	  took	  the	  form	  of	  a	  written	  opinion:	  the	  Avis	  des	  Députés	  .13	  Moreover,	  nothing	  in	  the	  way	  the	  Députés	  worked	  and	  addressed	  the	  King’s	  men	  suggests	  a	  notion	  of	  democratic	  representation	  or	  political	  legitimacy.	  Significantly,	  there	  was	  no	  hint	  that	  the	  latter	  were	  in	  any	  sense	  bound	  by	  the	  Avis.	  If	  the	  college	  of	  Députés	  argued	  in	  the	  name	  of	  any	  superior	  notion,	  it	  was	  not	  the	  good	  of	  their	  cities	  of	  origin	  or	  the	  interest	  of	  their	  own	  social	  class;	  rhetorically,	  they	  used	  to	  speak	  in	  the	  name	  of	  “the	  good	  of	  commerce,”	  which	  was	  framed	  as	  a	  fully	  legitimate	  sub-­‐part	  of	  the	  public	  good,	  or	  of	  “the	  good	  of	  the	  kingdom”	  (Kessler,	  2007;	  Kammerling	  Smith,	  1995).	  
The	  other	  college	  was	  composed	  of	  two	  categories	  of	  bureaucrats.	  First	  were	  those	  who	  worked	  mostly	  at	  the	  Bureau	  and	  who	  were	  therefore	  its	  bureaucratic	  backbone.	  Here	  we	  find	  the	  head	  of	   the	   Bureau,	   plus	   four	   key	   assistants,	   themselves	   high-­‐fliers	   of	   the	   royal	   bureaucracy,	   with	  access	   to	   the	   closed	   circles	   of	   advisors	   to	   the	  King.	   Each	   had	   oversight	   of	   a	   given	   portfolio	   of	  provinces.	   They	   coordinated	   the	   investigative	   work	   and	   interacted	   on	   a	   daily	   basis	   with	   the	  agents	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  its	  territorial	  network,	  primarily	  the	  provincial	  Intendants,	  who	  became	  a	  key	  voice	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  privilèges	   to	  firms.	  The	  Parisian	  bureaucrats	  also	  took	   care	   of	   the	   ulterior	   implementation	   of	   decisions	   and	   kept	   personal	   archives	   that	   remain	  until	  today	  a	  key	  source	  of	  information	  on	  the	  daily	  work	  at	  the	  Bureau.	  
These	  key	  bureaucrats	  from	  the	  Bureau	  did	  not	  make	  decisions	  alone,	  however.	  Another	  set	  of	  top	  bureaucrats	  from	  various	  branches	  or	  departments	  of	  the	  government	  were	  also	  involved	  in	  the	  meetings	  in	  which	  the	  cases,	  once	  investigated,	  were	  debated	  and	  decided.14	  	  	  There	  was	  no	  formal	  hierarchy	  among	  the	  officials	  who	  took	  part	  in	  these	  meetings,	  and	  the	  final	  outcome	  of	  their	   deliberation	   took	   again	   the	   form	   of	   a	   written	   proposal	   that	   was	   sent	   to	   the	  Minister	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Read, for instance, Quenet (1978) on the Députés from Nantes; Labraque-Bordenave (1889) on the case of 
Bordeaux, Pariset (1887) for Lyon, and Fournier (1920) for Marseille; this latter city was apparently well-known 
for the resources it mobilized for corrupting high officials and low-level informants in Paris.  
13 Individual Députés had the right to submit in their own name a dissenting opinion, but we have evidence for 
only two cases of this among the claims for privilèges we investigated. 
14 Interestingly, two categories of experts were involved in those meetings without taking part in the final 
decisions. Representatives of the tax farms were present, while they did not vote. Similarly, the Députés attended 
the plenary meeting of the Bureau, but spoke only if asked to, and had no say in the final decisions. 
12	  	  
Finance.	  In	  almost	  all	  cases,	  he	  endorsed	  this	  motion	  without	  any	  modification.15	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  minister	   acted	   as	   if	   he	   trusted	   that	   this	   open,	   formally	   rational	   administrative	   procedure	  offered	   him	   the	   best	   practical	   guarantees	   against	   capture,	   misinformation,	   incompetence	   or	  contestation.16	  The	  fact	  that	  these	  reports	  were	  presented	  to	  him	  as	  a	  consensus	  position	  of	  the	  
Bureau	  further	  underlines	  the	  point:	  At	  least	  formally,	  he	  did	  not	  want	  to	  know	  who	  favored	  this	  or	   that	   direction.	   An	   important	   consequence,	   from	   a	   methodological	   perspective,	   is	   that	   the	  records	   and	   minutes	   of	   the	   Bureau,	   just	   like	   the	   Avis	   des	   Députés,	   do	   not	   offer	   any	   tangible	  indications	   regarding	   the	   opinion	   of	   each	   individual	   member	   of	   these	   two	   colleges.	  What	   we	  know	  are	  their	  collective	  positions.	  	  
We	   now	   assess	   to	   what	   extent	   this	   formally	   rational	   bureaucratic	   framework	   supported	   a	  decision-­‐making	  procedure	   that	   actually	   reflected,	   in	   practice,	   rational	   rules	   of	   argumentation	  and	   deliberation.	   We	   do	   so	   by	   investigating	   a	   specific	   set	   of	   decisions:	   the	   distribution	   of	  
privilèges	  to	  entrepreneurs.	  
3.4.	  The	  case	  of	  Granting	  Privilèges	  to	  Manufacturers	  
The	  main	  economic	  rationale	  underlying	  the	  policy	  of	  granting	  privilèges	  to	  private	  firms	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  economy	  where	  entry	  was	  highly	  regulated—hence	  the	  need	  for	  a	   legal	  status	   for	  start-­‐ups—and	  that	  was	   largely	  devoid	  of	  a	  market	   for	  risk	  capital,	  hence	  the	   need	   for	   some	   support	   to	   entrepreneurs.	   Since	   product	   markets	   were	   generally	   quite	  competitive,	  and	  because	  contractual	  discipline	  was	  well	  enforced	  by	  the	  elected	  traders’	  courts,	  the	  risk	  of	  failure	  was	  prevalent	  and	  well	  understood.	  Indeed,	  outright	  demands	  for	  a	  bailout	  by	  government	   were	   never	   accepted	   and	   exemptions	   from	   bankruptcy	   procedures	   were	  exceptional.	  In	  fact,	  we	  have	  found	  many	  examples	  of	  entrepreneurs	  who	  proposed	  to	  take	  over	  
privilèges	  that	  had	  been	  given	  to	  a	  former	  firm,	  which	  then	  ceased	  operations	  or	  was	  liquidated.	  In	  a	  context	  that	  was	  very	  much	  averse	  to	  risk-­‐taking	  and	  investment,	  the	  distribution	  of	  rents,	  under	   the	   form	  of	  privilèges,	   thus	   needed	   to	   be	   rationalized	   as	   a	  way	   of	   guaranteeing	   a	   given	  income	  flow	  over	  a	  period	  of	  two	  to	  twenty	  years,	  so	  as	  to	  increase	  the	  chances	  of	  success.	  To	  a	  non-­‐trivial	  extent,	  the	  discussions	  at	  the	  Bureau,	  as	  reflected	  by	  its	  minutes,	  can	  actually	  be	  read	  as	   a	   collective	   attempt	   at	   measuring	   this	   implicit	   income	   flow,	   while	   minimizing	   adverse	  consequences	  on	  third	  parties,	  like	  competitors,	  consumers	  or	  the	  fiscal	  administration.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In the cases we investigated, there is only one instance of the Ministry not endorsing the recommendation of 
the Bureau 
16 Moreover, as shown by the correspondence of the Ministry of Finance, he relied upon the procedure and the 
Bureau, to resist important persons’ support to specific claims. He wrote the latter that he was unable to back-up 
their demand since he did not master the process within the Bureau. And there is no trace in his correspondence 
of any pressure or recommendations sent to the Bureau. 
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Here	  is	  how	  the	  Bureau	  attempted	  to	  reach	  that	  end.	  
i.	  Individual	  applications	  for	  privilèges	  from	  manufacturers	  were	  either	  directly	  addressed	  to	  the	  
Bureau	  or	  they	  were	  transferred	  to	  it	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  its	  agents	  in	  the	  provinces:	  the	  Intendants.17	  These	  applications	  included	  a	  description	  of	  the	  project,	  some	  technical	  details,	  considerations	   regarding	   implementation,	   and	   some	   information	   on	   the	   background	   of	   the	  entrepreneur.	   They	   almost	   never	   included	   quantitative	   data,	   like	   accounts,	   not	   to	   speak	   of	  forecasts.	   Typically,	   the	   entrepreneur	   brought	   forward	   the	   expected	   collective	   benefits	   of	   his	  projects	   and	   the	  precedents	   that	   could	  buttress	  his	   case	   (e.g.,	  privilèges	   that	  had	  already	  been	  granted	  to	  similar	  endeavors).	  He	  typically	  attempted	  to	  offer	  putative	  proofs	  of	  his	  assertions	  and	  underlined	  the	  risks	  and	  costs	  of	  his	  venture,	  which	  were	  the	  ultimate	  rationale	  underlying	  his	   request.	  De	  novo	  projects	  and	  demands	   for	  an	  extension	  or	  a	   renewal	  of	  existing	  privilèges	  would	  go	  through	  the	  same	  process. 	  
ii.	   Individual	   applications	   were	   then	   processed	   by	   one	   of	   the	   members	   of	   the	   Bureau’s	  administrative	  backbone,	  who,	  in	  turn,	  asked	  for	  factual	  reports	  or	  for	  the	  opinion	  of	  a	  more	  or	  less	   extended	   array	   of	   stakeholders	   or	   experts.	   In	   the	   many	   cases	   where	   the	   project	   was	  supposed	  to	  contribute	  to	  local	  development	  or	  could	  have	  a	  specific	  impact	  at	  the	  city/province	  level,	   the	  respective	   Intendant	   (i.e.	   the	   local	  agent	  of	  Ministry)	  had	   to	  report	  comprehensively.	  He	  would	  cover	  both	  the	  impact	  on	  demand	  (in	  terms	  of	  availability	  and	  pricing	  of	  the	  products)	  and	   on	   the	   supply	   side	   (competitors	   and	   potential	   complements	   in	   the	   value	   chain).	   The	  
Intendants	   also	   looked	   at	   the	   potential	   effect	   of	   the	   project	   on	   scarce	   local	   resources,	   in	  particular	  natural	   resources	  and	   the	  workforce.	  As	  a	   rule,	   their	   reports	  were	   largely	  based	  on	  consultations	  with	  local	  experts	  and	  stakeholders	  like	  the	  local	  chamber	  of	  commerce,	  municipal	  or	  provincial	  authorities,	  or	  the	  guilds.	  Occasionally	  the	  Bureau	  also	  asked	  for	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  tax	   farms	  (especially	  when	  significant	   tax	  cuts	  or	  subsidies	  were	  claimed	   for)	  or	   the	  Académie	  
des	  Sciences	  (when	  the	  project	  was	  based	  on	  a	  claim	  of	  technical	  innovation).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Kammerling Smith (1995, 2002), among others, argues that demands and cases submitted to the Bureau were 
typically prepared and sponsored by intermediaries, with personal access to the Ministry. We underline at this 
point that: (i) Kammerling Smith’s examples almost exclusively concern judicial or administrative disputes 
between the central state and local public bodies of various sorts, not submissions for private privilèges; (ii) the 
very fact that ex ante applicants may have relied on advisors when preparing their submission does not per se 
repudiate the possibility of rational decision-making by the Bureau later on; (iii) we systematically checked for 
any possible alternative circuit or external pressure or influence on the decisions themselves, and found neither 
any decree granting individual privilèges of manufacture unrelated to a decision elaborated in the Bureau, nor 
evidence of pressures received by the Bureau (see the appendix 2). Moreover, the point made by Kammerling 
Smith that applications were drafted with the help of paid lobbyists, mostly lawyers, does not contradict our 
point. Indeed, the fact that consultants were needed can be seen as a proof that the procedure imposed a common 
logic of argumentation on all participants in the process. 
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iii.	  Once	  this	  investigation	  was	  completed,	  the	  applicant’s	  written	  submission,	  together	  with	  all	  the	   reports	   and	   opinions,	   were	   transmitted	   to	   the	  Députés,	   who	   used	   to	  meet	   and	   deliberate	  twice	   a	  week.	   In	   case	   no	   further	   investigation	  was	   needed,	   a	   collective	  Avis	   was	   immediately	  written.	  Otherwise,	  more	  work	  and	  information	  could	  be	  asked	  for.	  Usually,	  the	  written	  Avis	  des	  
Députés	   summarized	   the	   demand,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   pros	   and	   cons,	   and	   it	   was	   concluded	   by	  proposition	  to	  either	  accept,	  reject	  or	  curtail	  the	  demand.	  	  
iv.	   At	   least	   three	   times	   a	   month	   (during	   the	   period	   under	   review),	   plenary	   meetings	   of	   the	  
Bureau,	   i.e.	   the	   second	  deliberative	   college,	   reviewed	   the	   cases	   and	  proceeded	   to	   a	  decision—again	   if	   the	   investigation	  was	  considered	   to	  be	  completed.	  As	   said,	   the	   final	  position	  was	   then	  sent	   to	   the	   Minister	   of	   Finance	   for	   endorsement	   This	   most	   important	   document	   included	   a	  detailed	   discussion	   of	   the	   grounds	   for	   granting	   some	  privilèges,	   and	   a	   list	   of	   the	   benefits	   that	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  appropriate.	  This	  was	  expressed	  as	  a	  collective	  and	  unanimous	  decision.	  Alternately,	   if	   the	   application	  was	   rejected,	   only	   an	   internal	   record	  was	   kept,	   with	   no	   formal	  reporting	  to	  the	  minister.	  
v.	   After	   a	   generally	   short	   delay—i.e.,	   three	   weeks	   to	   a	   month—the	   Bureau	   formalized	   the	  confirmed	  (positive)	  decision	  of	  the	  Minister,	  under	  the	  form	  of	  a	  legally	  binding	  Arrêt	  (decree)	  that	  again	  summarized	  the	  initial	  application,	  the	  arguments	  that	  had	  been	  considered	  valid,	  and	  the	  actual	  privilèges	  that	  were	  now	  officially	  granted.	  As	  a	  whole,	  the	  standard	  decision	  process	  generally	  took	  four	  to	  five	  months.	  
What	   this	   administrative	   procedure	   suggests	   is	   that	   the	   debates	   within	   the	  Bureau	   were	   not	  structured	   as	   a	   negotiation	  whereby	   conflicting	   parties	  would	   try	   to	   reach	   a	   compromise	   and	  balance	   their	  respective	   interests	   in	  a	  mutually	  satisfactory	  manner.	  The	  Députés,	   for	   instance,	  did	  not	  argue	  in	  the	  name	  of	  their	  city	  of	  origin,	  or	  apparently	  try	  to	  build	  alliances	  in	  order	  to	  extract	  maximal	  benefits	   for	   their	  constituents.	  Rather,	  as	   far	  as	   the	  records	  of	   the	  Bureau	   can	  tell,	   the	  underlying	  norm	  that	  governed	  exchanges	  within	  the	  two	  colleges	  were:	  1/	  to	  pool	  all	  relevant	   sources	   of	   information,	   expertise	   and	   expressions	   of	   interest;	   and	   2/	   to	   reach	   a	  collective	   conclusion	   that	  would	  best	   satisfy	   a	  practical	   criteria	   of	   reasonableness	  while	  being	  justifiable	  to	  third	  parties.	  In	  this	  sense,	  though	  it	  was	  decided	  and	  implemented	  from	  the	  center,	  this	   policy	   also	   aimed	   at	   preventing	   subsequent	   discontent	   or	   resistance.	   While	   the	   Ancien	  
Régime	  monarchy	  rejected	  any	  institution	  of	  political	  representation,	  it	  was	  keen	  not	  to	  confront	  large	  social	  interests,	  like	  merchants	  and	  the	  political	  elites	  in	  the	  provinces.	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4-­‐	  The	  Archives	  of	  the	  Bureau	  and	  the	  Database	  
4.1.	  	  The	  Minutes	  of	  the	  Deliberation	  Process	  and	  Associated	  Papers	  
One	   benefit	   of	   the	   institutional	   stability	   of	   the	   Bureau	   is	   the	   comprehensive	   and	   well-­‐kept	  character	   of	   its	   archives:	   Most	   of	   the	   time,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   piece	   together	   how	   individual	  applications	  were	   received,	   investigated,	  discussed	  and	  decided.	  We	  rely	  primarily	  on	   the	  Avis	  
des	   Députés,	   the	   contributions	   of	   the	   provincial	   Intendants,	   and	   the	   various	   minutes	   of	   the	  deliberations	   of	   the	   Bureau;	   most	   often	   they	   include	   the	   final	   decision,	   plus	   the	   Arrêt,	   that	  formalized	  the	  privilege	  to	  be	  granted.	  Out	  of	  these	  sources,	  we	  have	  thus	  been	  able	  to	  identify	  in	  most	  cases:	  1/	  the	  content	  of	  the	  initial	  application	  and	  the	  arguments	  that	  supported	  it;	  2/	  the	  position	   and	   arguments	   brought	   forward	   by	   the	   provincial	   Intendants;	   3/	   the	   collective	  judgment	  of	  the	  Députés;	  4/	  the	  conclusions	  reached	  at	  the	  plenary	  meeting	  of	  the	  Bureau;	  and	  5/	   the	   final	   decision	   with	   the	   list	   of	   privilèges	   that	   were	   actually	   granted	   and	   the	   official	  justification	  that	  backs	  them	  up.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  can	  differentiate	  between	  applications	  that	  were	  accepted,	  rejected	  or	  curtailed.	  But	  we	  also	  identify	  the	  economic	  profile	  of	  each	  individual	  project,	   which	   player	   took	   an	   active	   part	   in	   the	   deliberation	   and	   what	   each	   of	   them	   thought	  about	  each	  project.	  	  
In	  practice,	  the	  applicants	  proposed	  to	  launch	  businesses	  as	  diverse	  as	  paper	  mills,	  iron	  or	  textile	  manufacturers,	  earthenware	  or	  glass	  factories,	  etc.	  But	  we	  also	  found	  projects	  for	  services,	  such	  as	  pumps	  for	  water	  provision,	  warehouses	  for	  long-­‐distance	  traders,	  or	  transportation	  services.	  It	  could	  also	  cover	  the	  right	  to	  exploit	  a	  resource,	  like	  a	  mine,	  or	  a	  technical	  invention.	  The	  sets	  of	  benefits	   requested	  could,	   in	   the	   first	   instance,	   affect	   the	  business	  per	  se.	  The	   first	   item	  on	   this	  count	   was	   legal	   authorization	   to	   establish	   a	   self-­‐standing	   business,	   typically	   outside	   the	  framework	   of	   guilds.	   The	   applicant	   could	   also	   seek	   a	   higher	   status,	   such	   as	  Manufacture	   or	  
Manufacture	  Royale,	   associated	  with	  higher	   levels	  of	   legal	  protection	  but	  also	  with	   the	  need	   to	  comply	   with	   specific	   regulations	   covering	   processes	   and	   products,	   and	   to	   reach	   certain	  standards	   of	   quality.	   Second,	   territorial	   exclusivity	   could	   be	   granted.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  manufacturers	  these	  territorial	  exclusivities	  were	  designed	  to	  guarantee	  a	  given	  income	  stream,	  and	   limit	   the	   pressure	   on	   scarce	   local	   resources,	   like	   wood	   or	   fresh	   water.	   These	   producers’	  monopolies	  have	  attracted	  a	  lot	  of	  attention	  (e.g.,	  Ekelund	  and	  Tollisson,	  1981	  and	  1989;	  Root,	  1994),	   though	   they	   typically	   came	  with	   important	   though	  often-­‐neglected	  qualifications.	   First,	  their	   spatial	  extension	  was	  generally	  bounded	   to	   ten	   to	   twenty	  kilometers	  or	   (more	  rarely)	   to	  one	  of	   the	  34	  provinces;	  only	   invention	  could	  result	   in	  a	  national	  monopoly	  (hence,	   they	  were	  proto-­‐patents).	  Second,	  while	  competitors	  could	  not	  establish	  plants	  or	  workshops	  within	  these	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zones,	   they	   could	   enter	   the	   local	   market	   and	   sell	   their	   own	   products.	   The	   rent	   to	   the	   local	  producer	   was	   therefore	   a	   function	   of	   transportation	   costs	   and	   internal	   tariffs.	   Lastly,	   the	  
privilège	   could	   include	  a	  break	  on	   taxes	   levied	  on	   inputs	   imported	   from	  other	  regions	  or	   from	  abroad,	  or	  on	  products	  that	  the	  entrepreneur	  expected	  to	  sell	  within	  the	  Kingdom	  or	  outside.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  fair	  part	  of	  the	  bargain	  with	  the	  administration	  boiled	  down	  to	  the	  manipulation	  of	  transportation	  costs	  as	  a	  means	  of	  fine-­‐tuning	  support	  to	  individual	  manufacturers.	  	  
Beyond	   the	   benefits	   that	   targeted	   the	   firm	   and	   its	   production	   function,	   a	   series	   of	   possible	  benefits	  supported	  the	  person	  of	  the	  entrepreneur,	  his	  associates	  or	  the	  workers.	  They	  typically	  included	  exemptions	  on	  income	  tax.	  Skilled	  workers	  attracted	  from	  abroad	  could	  also	  be	  allowed	  to	   enter	   the	   Kingdom	   free	   of	   tax	   and	   could	   benefit	   from	   ad-­‐hoc	   fiscal	   advantages.	   Even	   low-­‐skilled	  workers	  could	  be	  targeted	  with	  consumption	  tax-­‐cuts	  (e.g.,	  on	  alcohol	  and	  tobacco).	  Non-­‐monetary	   benefits	   were	   often	   included,	   like	   exemption	   from	   billeting	   soldiers	   or	   from	   the	  obligation	   to	   serve	   in	   the	   local	  militia.	   Lastly,	   there	   were	   straightforward	   public	   subsidies	   or	  loans	  from	  the	  Crown,	  though	  these	  were	  rarely	  requested	  and	  even	  more	  rarely	  granted:	  Self-­‐selection	  by	  informed	  applicants	  is	  apparent	  at	  this	  point.	  	  
These	  various	  benefits	  were	  always	  requested	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  argumentation	  elaborated	  by	  the	   claimant,	   and	   then	   discussed	   on	   the	   same	   ground,	   by	   the	   various	   voices	   involved	   in	   the	  decision	  process.	  Interestingly,	  the	  final	  report	  to	  the	  Minister	  and	  the	  formal	  decree	  listed	  the	  considerations	  that	  were	  officially	  recognized	  to	  justify	  positive	  decisions.	  These	  considerations	  revolved	  around	  the	  interests	  of	  consumers	  (i.e.	  supply),	  the	  contribution	  to	  local	  development	  of	   provinces	   or	   cities,	   the	   contribution	   to	   the	   trade	   balance	   (either	   though	   higher	   exports	   or	  import	   substitution),	   and	   technological	   change.	   We	   find	   here	   the	   classical	   items	   of	   the	  mercantilist	   discourse.	   Side	   effects,	   like	   the	   impact	   on	   employment	   or	   poverty,	   were	   also	  considered.	  On	  that	  basis,	  the	  demand	  for	  support	  to	  the	  entrepreneur	  was	  justified	  by	  high	  level	  of	  investments,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  developing	  a	  new	  technique,	  the	  need	  to	  attract	  skilled	  labor	  or	  to	   have	   long-­‐term	   guaranteed	   access	   to	   a	   given	   natural	   resource.	   Of	   course,	   any	   of	   those	  arguments	   could	   easily	   be	   contested:	   a	   technology	   could	   be	   considered	   as	   not	   innovative,	   the	  proposal	   to	   export	   products	  might	   be	   judged	   unrealistic,	   or	   local	   stakeholders	   could	   alert	   the	  Parisian	   bureaucrats	   that	  many	   producers	  were	   already	   churning	   out	   the	   same	   type	   of	   fabric	  without	  public	  support.	  In	  addition,	  the	  potential	  negative	  effects	  of	  the	  requested	  advantages—such	   as	   the	   risk	   of	   distorting	   competition—could	   be	   pointed	   out.	   In	   the	   latter	   case,	   the	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contributors	  to	  the	  decision	  could	  propose	  a	  more	  adequate	  type	  of	  privilège	   if	  the	  project	  was	  considered	  worthy	  of	  support.18	  	  
In	  order	  to	  explore	  this	  deliberation	  and	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  we	  coded	  all	   the	  arguments	  brought	   forward	   by	   the	   main	   contributors	   to	   the	   decision	   process	   as	   well	   as	   their	   detailed	  opinion	  on	   the	  privilèges	   that	   should	  be	  granted	  or	  not.	  We	  also	   collected	  additional	   variables	  that	   are	   used	   for	   various	   controls.	   Each	   project	   is	   identified	   in	   terms	   of	   localization	   and	  jurisdiction,	  date,	  and	  industry.	  Moreover,	  we	  characterize	  whether	  it	  concerns	  luxury	  industries	  and	  foreign	  entrepreneurs.	  This	  allows	  testing	  for	  any	  of	  the	  usual	  “policy	  preferences”	  typically	  associated	  with	  French	  mercantilism.	  
We	  have	  coded	  these	  details	  on	  the	  281	  cases	  that	  were	  submitted	  to	  the	  Bureau	  between	  1724	  and	  1744,	   a	  period	   that	  was	  marked	  by	   substantial	   political	   and	  bureaucratic	   stability	   and	  by	  relative	  economic	  prosperity.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  this	  population	  of	  cases	  does	  not	  suffer	  from	  serious	  biases,	  we	  first	  made	  sure	  that	  privilèges	   to	  private	   firms	  were	  actually	   issued	  by	  the	  Bureau	  only,	   i.e.	   that	  entrepreneurs	  could	  not	  by-­‐pass	   its	  procedure.	  We	  can	   indeed	  affirm	  that	  the	  281	  cases	  that	  we	  coded	  represent	  the	  whole	  population	  of	  manufacturers	  supported	  by	  the	  Ministry	  during	  the	  said	  period.	  In	  addition,	  we	  systematically	  checked	  for	  signs	  or	  traces,	  in	  the	   archives	  of	   the	  Ministry,	   of	   outside	   interventions	   into	   the	  decisions	  on	  privilèges:	  We	   thus	  looked	  at	  all	  the	  correspondence	  between	  the	  Minister	  and	  the	  Bureau,	  the	  provincial	  Intendants	  and	  outside,	  private	  persons.	  In	  these	  thousands	  of	   letters	  and	  memos	  we	  did	  not	  find	  a	  single	  indication	  of	  possibly	  successful	  pressure	  by	  a	  crony,	  broker	  or	  patron.19	  Our	  empirical	  strategy	  aims	  at	  confirming	  these	  initial	  findings,	  by	  testing	  the	  internal	  consistency	  of	  decisions	  made	  at	  the	  Bureau,	  hence	  its	  capacity	  to	  make	  decisions	  on	  its	  own	  terms.	  	  
4.2.	  The	  Data:	  Descriptive	  Statistics.	  
Out	  of	  281	  cases	  that	  were	  coded,	  we	  worked	  on	  a	  core	  data-­‐set	  of	  267	  applications	  that	  include	  the	  details	  of	  the	  initial	  claim	  and	  the	  final	  decision.20	  Out	  of	  these	  267	  decisions,	  215	  also	  come	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 All the arguments put forward during the investigations are presented in Table A1 in Appendix. 
19 In the correspondence from the Minister, we found only four letters related to Privilege de Manufacture over 
the 20 years period of investigation. Moreover, in all these cases the reply of the Minister was that he was unable 
to do anything since the procedure was in the hands of the Bureau du Commerce. Moreover, we did not find any 
letter to members of the Bureau du Commerce giving instructions on claims under investigation. He transmitted 
information and asked for opinion, but never suggested decisions. See the historical appendix for more details. 
20 The drop between the 281 investigated cases and the 267 decisions in our database is occasioned by 
applications that were investigated by the Bureau, but without track being kept of the final decision (14 cases). 
Generally it corresponds to cases where the members of the bureau considered that they did not have sufficient 
information and asked for a complementary investigation They are thus de facto refusals (since we were unable 
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with	  an	  Avis	  des	  Députés,	   and	  136	  with	  a	  report	  by	   the	  provincial	   Intendants.	  Opinions	  of	  both	  
Intendants	   and	   Députés	   are	   included	   in	   111	   files,	   though	   of	   course	   this	   does	   not	   imply	   that	  incomplete	  files	  are	  of	  no	  use	  in	  our	  inquiry.	  The	  absence	  of	  one	  of	  these	  contributions	  may	  have	  various	  causes.	  The	  Intendants	  were	  not	  consulted	  on	  all	  cases,	  especially	  when	  projects	  did	  not	  focus	  on	  a	  specific	   local	   implementation	  (e.g.,	  a	  technical	   innovation);	  the	  Avis	  des	  Députés	  may	  have	   been	   lost;	   and	   some	   applications	  were	   also	   rejected	   out	   of	   hand,	   in	  which	   case	   detailed	  reasons	   are	   not	   given.	   The	  members	   of	   the	  Bureau	  would	   only	  write	   that	   this	   application	  has	  become	   irrelevant—a	   judgment	   that	   can	   occasionally	   be	   confirmed	   even	   by	   a	   21st	   century	  reader.	  	  	  
Table	  1	  describes	  the	  main	  features	  of	  the	  applications	  in	  our	  sample.	  Just	  over	  10%	  of	  them	  ask	  for	   de	   facto	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   on	   an	   innovation.	   The	   remaining	   cases	   are	   industrial	  ventures,	   almost	   two-­‐thirds	   of	   which	   are	   new	   ones,	   while	   the	   remaining	   third	   is	   founded	   on	  already	   granted	   privilèges	   that	   the	   applicant	   wanted	   confirmed	   or	   extended.	   Over	   the	   entire	  sample,	   the	   rate	   of	   rejection	   is	   significant	   (28.5%).	   Moreover,	   in	   another	   29.2%	   of	   the	  applications,	   the	  granted	  privilèges	  were	  reduced	  as	  compared	  with	   the	   initial	  demand.	  Hence,	  less	  than	  half	  of	  applications	  were	  ultimately	  fully	  successful	  (42.3%).	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Descriptive	   statistics	   also	   show	   that	   the	   different	   parties	   to	   the	   discussion	   had	   different	  inclinations	  or	  preferences.	  Table	  2	  shows	  that	  the	  Députés	  present	  a	  more	  restrictive	  bias	  and	  more	  often	  recommend	  that	  demands	  be	  curtailed	   than	   the	   Intendants.	  Altogether,	  and	   from	  a	  descriptive	   viewpoint,	   the	   final	   decisions	   seem	   to	   have	   been	   more	   often	   aligned	   with	   the	  recommendations	   of	   the	  Députés	   than	   those	   of	   the	   Intendants	   (Table	   3).	   That	   being	   said,	   the	  
Députés	   and	   the	   Intendants	   rarely	   disagreed	   entirely:	   In	   only	   5.4%	   of	   cases	   does	   one	   party	  recommend	  rejection	  while	  the	  other	  defends	  full	  approval	  (Table	  4).	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to identify related decrees granting privilèges), but since they are not motivated they cannot be included in our 
analysis. 
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As	  a	  whole,	  these	  various	  descriptive	  elements	  support	  our	  hypothesis	  that	  this	  decision-­‐making	  process	  was	  ex	  ante	  open	  and	   contested.	  Prima	  facie,	   applicants	   could	  not	  have	  a	   clear	  hint	  of	  their	  chance	  of	  success	  and	  self-­‐selection	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  systematic.	  	  
Tables	  5	  and	  6,	  which	  list	  the	  arguments	  respectively	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  Députés	  and	  Intendants	  and	  their	   frequency,	   further	  underline	   the	  relative	  divergence	   in	   their	  respective	  opinions	  and	  underlying	   preferences.	   The	   most	   prevalent	   deviations	   (Table	   6)	   confirm	   that	   the	   provincial	  
Intendants	   gave	   substantial	  weight	   to	   considerations	   about	   the	   local	   economy	   and	   its	   natural	  resources.	  Alternately,	  the	  Députés	  insisted	  more	  on	  the	  innovative	  character	  of	  the	  projects	  and	  were	   more	   prone	   to	   underline	   adverse	   potential	   impacts	   on	   competition.	   Still,	   this	   contrast	  should	  not	  be	  overstated:	  Table	  6	  shows	  that	  among	  the	  seven	  most	  frequently	  used	  arguments,	  five	   are	   the	   same.	   While	   these	   parties	   had	   different	   inclinations	   and	   assessmentd,	   this	   was	  apparently	  a	  matter	  of	  divergence	  in	  perceptions	  rather	  than	  the	  expression	  of	  radical	  conflicts	  of	  opinion.21	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5.	  Empirical	  Analysis	  	  
5.1.	  Estimation	  Strategy	  	  
In	  order	  to	  further	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  at	  the	  Bureau,	  we	  now	  try	  to	  identify	  econometrically	  the	  determinants	  of	  its	  Final	  Decision	  (FD).	  We	  thus	  distinguish	  three	  main	  possible	  outcomes:	  applications	  could	  be	  rejected	  (0),	  they	  could	  be	  partially	  successful	  (1)	  or	   the	   entire	   set	   of	   requested	  privilèges	   could	   be	   handed	   out	   (2).	  We	   thus	   obtain	   the	   ordinal	  dependent	   variable	  FD	   =	   {0,1,2}.22	  In	   a	   first	   step,	  we	   explore	   how	   the	   Intendants	   and	  Députés	  respectively	   influenced	   the	  distribution	  of	   the	   final	  decision	  (FD):	   the	  variables	   IR	   (Intendants’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This evidence should put to rest an old debate on the ideological inclination of the Députés. Cole (1943) 
argued in an early contribution that they favored consensus and continuity with the Colbertist legacy; conversely, 
Rothkrug (1965) and Scoville (1982) defend that the Députés were in fact “laisser-faire” militants who 
represented an early political and social opposition to the dirigiste tradition. This result shows that a tangible 
degree of divergence in the respective policy preferences was a key pattern of debates within the Bureau, though 
the extent of the underlying consensus is very strong. The internal debate, in practice, was not about the policy 
aim and the instrument of the Bureau, but about how to handle the latter, depending upon the context of each 
case.  
 
22 Definitions and summary statistics of all the variables used in the empirical analysis are provided in Table A1 
in Appendix. 
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Recommendation)	   and	   DR	   (Députés’	   Recommendation)	   are	   built	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   FD;	  depending	  upon	  whether	  the	  respective	  party	  recommends	  either	  rejection,	  a	  partial	  grant,	  or	  a	  complete	   one.	  Therefore,	   IR	   and	  DR	  are	   also	   ordinal	   variables,	  with	   IR=DR={0,1,2}.	  We	  use	   an	  ordered	   logistic	   model	   (ologit)	   in	   order	   to	   assess	   the	   influence	   of	   each	   of	   them	   on	   the	   final	  decision:	  
	   P(FDi	  >	  j)	  =	  αi.IRi	  +	  βi.DRi	  +	  γi.Xi	  +	  εi	  	  	  for	  j	  =	  0,1	  	   (1)	  	   P(FDi	  >	  j)	  =	  δi.Veto-­‐Di	  +	  µi.Veto-­‐Ri	  +	  γi.Xi	  +	  εi	  	  	  for	  j	  =	  0,1	  	   (2)	  
Where	  FDi	   is	   the	   ordinal	   dependent	   variable	   for	   each	   individual	   demand	   i,	   j	   is	   the	   number	   of	  decision	   categories	   and	  α and	   β the	   two	   coefficients	   associated	   with	   Intendants’	   and	  Députés’	  recommendations	   in	  Equation	  (1).	   In	  Equation	  (2),	  we	  test	   for	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  implicit	  veto	  power	  by	   one	  or	   the	   other	   of	   these	  bodies.	  Hence,	   the	   variable	  Veto-­‐D	   is	   equal	   to	   1	  when	   the	  
Députés	  recommend	  refusal	  while	  Intendants	  propose	  either	  a	  partial	  or	  an	  entire	  grant	  (5	  cases	  over	   109).	   Conversely,	   the	   variable	  Veto-­‐I	   is	   equal	   to	   1	  when	   Intendants	   favor	   rejection	  while	  
Députés	  call	  for	  a	  partial	  or	  an	  entire	  grant	  (5	  cases	  over	  109).	  In	  both	  Equations	  (1)	  and	  (2),	  Xi	  is	  a	   vector	   of	   three	   control	   variables:	   Luxury	   is	   a	   discrete	   variable	   for	   Privilèges	   demanded	  concerning	   luxury	   product;	  Foreigner	   is	   a	   discrete	   variable	   accounting	   for	   a	   demand	  made	   by	  foreign	  entrepreneur	  and	  Year	  stands	  for	  the	  date	  of	  the	  demand	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  results	  are	  not	   driven	  by	   time	   trends.	  We	   also	   include	   sector-­‐group	  dummies.	   Fixed	   effects	   reflecting	   the	  regional	   dimension	   could	   not	   be	   included	   since	   there	   were	   34	   different	   provinces:	   province-­‐dummies	   would	   have	   prohibitively	   reduced	   the	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   of	   the	   ordered	   logistic	  model.	   To	   limit	   the	   impact	   of	   this	   issue	   and	   to	   account	   for	   potential	   heteroschedasticity	   and	  auto-­‐correlation	  of	  error	   terms	  within	  geographical	  areas,	  we	  clustered	  standard	  errors	  at	   the	  regional	  level	  in	  all	  of	  our	  regressions.	  
Caution	   is	   still	   warranted	   when	   interpreting	   ologit	   regression	   results.	   First,	   one	   of	   the	  assumptions	   underlying	   ordered	   logistic	  model	   is	   that	   the	   “distances”	   between	   categories	   are	  equal;	  i.e.,	  the	  parallel-­‐line	  or	  proportional-­‐odds	  assumption	  should	  be	  respected.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  implies	  that	  switching	  from	  rejection	  to	  a	  restricted	  set	  of	  privilèges	  represents	  the	  same	  “step”	  in	  terms	  of	  decision-­‐making	  as	  switching	  from	  a	  restricted	  set	  to	  the	  entire	  set	  of	  privilèges.	  This	  hypothesis	  is	  a	  priori	  violated,	  if	  only	  because	  cuts	  from	  the	  initial	  demands	  to	  a	  curtailed	  set	  of	  benefits	  vary	  across	  cases.	  Hence,	  errors	  in	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  coefficients	  can	  lead	  to	  incorrect	  or	   misleading	   results.	   However,	   two	   tests	   can	   be	   used	   at	   this	   point	   in	   order	   to	   assess	   the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  problem:	  the	  likelihood	  ratio	  test	  and	  the	  Brant	  test	  (Brant,	  1990).	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In	  addition,	  and	  as	  stressed	  by	  Williams	  (2006),	  there	  are	  two	  ways23	  to	  circumvent	  the	  problem	  of	   violating	   the	   parallel-­‐line	   assumption:	   an	   ordinal	   alternative	   (generalized	   ordered	   logistic	  model,	  or	  gologit)	  and/or	  a	  non-­‐ordinal	  alternative	  (multinomial	   logistic	  model,	  or	  mlogit).	  We	  use	  the	  gologit	  option	  for	  three	  reasons.	  The	  first	  advantage	  of	  the	  generalized	  ordered	  logistic	  model,	  when	  compared	  with	  multinomial	  logistic	  regression,	  is	  that	  it	  allows	  for	  variation	  in	  the	  coefficient	   value	   over	   the	   different	   categories	   of	   the	   ordinal	   dependent	   variable	   while	  constraining	  variables	  so	  that	  their	  effects	  meet	  the	  parallel-­‐line	  assumption	  (Fu	  1998,	  Williams	  2006).	   Second,	   generalized	   ordered	   logistic	   models	   offer	   the	   possibility	   of	   fitting	   a	   partial	  proportional	   odds	   model	   where	   the	   parallel	   regression	   constraint	   is	   relaxed	   only	   for	   the	  variables	   which	   actually	   violate	   the	   assumption,	   and	   not	   for	   all	   of	   the	   dependent	   variables	  (Williams	  2006).	  Lastly,	  as	  we	  shall	  show	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  generalized	  ordered	  logistic	  models	  maintain	   the	   ordinal	   structure	   of	   the	   dependent	   variable	   while	   being	   more	   parsimonious	   in	  terms	  of	  coefficient	  estimations	  and	  interpretation.	  
The	  discussion	  now	  develops	  along	  the	  following	  lines.	  A	  first	  set	  of	  tests	  assesses	  the	  respective	  influence	  of	  the	  Intendants	  and	  Députés	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  obtaining	  the	  Privilèges	  (Equation	  1).	  In	  a	   second	  set	  of	   estimations,	  we	   then	   focus	  on	   the	  qualitative	  arguments	  put	   forward	   in	   the	  final	   collective	   decision,	   as	   sent	   to	   the	   minister	   (Equation	   3).	   Lastly,	   we	   analyze	   how	   the	  qualitative	  arguments	  impact	  on	  the	  final	  decision	  of	  the	  Bureau	  given	  the	  identity	  of	  those—the	  
Députés	  and	  the	  Intendants—who	  put	  them	  forward	  (Equations	  5	  and	  7).	  By	  the	  same	  token	  we	  analyze	   how	   the	   various	   voices	   may	   develop	   differences	   in	   their	   analyses	   of	   the	   cases	   they	  examine	   (Equations	   4	   and	   6).	   Hence,	   we	   run	   ordered	   logit	   and	   generalized	   ordered	   logit	  estimates	  of	  the	  following	  five	  equations:	  
	   P(FDi	  >	  j)	  =	  αi.FINAL	  DECISION	  MOTIVATIONS	  +	  βi.Xi	  +	  εi	  	  	  for	  j	  =	  0.1	   (3)	  	   P(IRi	  >	  j)	  =	  αi.INTENDANTS’	  ARGUMENTS	  +	  βi.Xi	  +	  εi	  	  	  for	  j	  =	  0.1	  	   (4)	  	   P(FDi	  >	  j)	  =	  αi.INTENDANTS’	  ARGUMENTS	  +	  βi.Xi	  +	  εi	  	  	  for	  j	  =	  0.1	  	   (5)	  	   P(DRi	  >	  j)	  =	  αi.DÉPUTÉS’	  ARGUMENTS	  +	  βi.Xi	  +	  εi	  	  	  for	  j	  =	  0.1	  	   (6)	  	   P(FDi	  >	  j)	  =	  αi.DÉPUTÉS’	  ARGUMENTS	  +	  βi.Xi	  +	  εi	  	  	  for	  j	  =	  0.1	  	   (7)	  
Where	  FDi,	  IRi	  and	  DRi	  are	  the	  same	  variables	  as	  those	  previously	  mentioned,	  and	  Xi	  is	  the	  same	  vector	  of	  control	  variables	  (which	  includes	  Luxury,	  Foreigner,	  Year	  and	  sector	  dummies).	  
Three	   different	   vectors	   of	  motivations	   then	   correspond	   to	   the	  most	   recurrent	   arguments	   put	  forward	  by,	  respectively,	  the	  Députés,	  the	  Intendants	  and	  the	  final	  report	  sent	  to	  the	  Minister.	  As	  shown	   in	   Table	   5,	   each	   of	   them	   advances	   many	   different	   arguments	   though	   the	   size	   of	   our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Excepting the “solution” of ignoring it (which is a very frequent practice). 
22	  	  
sample	   prevents	   us	   from	   incorporating	   all	   of	   them	   separately	   in	   the	   regressions.	   We	   thus	  selected	  the	  arguments	  most	  frequently	  put	  forward	  by	  each	  party,	  i.e.,	  that	  were	  mentioned	  in	  more	   than	   10%	   of	   the	   cases.	   This	   brings	   a	   total	   of	   seven	   arguments	   for	   both	   Intendants	   and	  
Députés,	  and	  nine	  for	  final	  decisions.	  	  
5.2.	  Empirical	  Results	  
5.2.1.	  Contributions	  to	  the	  Final	  Decision	  	  
The	   first	   step	   estimates	   the	   likelihood	   of	   obtaining	   privilèges	   depending	   on	   the	  recommendations	   made	   respectively	   by	   the	   Intendants	   and	   the	   Députés.	   The	   results	   of	   the	  ordered	  logistic	  estimations	  are	  provided	  in	  Table	  7.	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Out	   of	   the	   267	   decisions,	   there	   are	   215	   decisions	   for	   which	   we	   have	   the	   Députés’	   opinions	  (Députés	  sample),	  136	  for	  which	  we	  have	  the	  Intendants’	  opinions	  (Intendants	  sample)	  and	  111	  for	   which	   we	   have	   both	   opinions	   (Both	   sample).	   Estimates	   of	   the	   likelihood	   of	   obtaining	  
Privilèges	   depending	   on	   the	   Députés’	   recommendations	   are	   provided	   in	   Column	   1;	   then	   we	  estimate	  this	  likelihood	  for	  the	  Intendants’	  recommendations	  in	  Column	  2	  and,	  finally,	  in	  Column	  3,	  we	  take	  both	  recommendations	  into	  account.	  The	  fourth	  and	  last	  column	  provides	  the	  result	  of	   Equation	   2	  where	  we	   test	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   informal	   “veto	   power”	   by	   the	   Intendants	  and/or	  Députés.	  	  	  
Results	  indicate	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  obtaining	  the	  requested	  privilèges	  is	  indeed	  an	  increasing	  function	  of	  support	  from	  both	  the	  Intendants	  and	  the	  Députés:	  The	  coefficients	  corresponding	  to	  variables	  IR	  and	  DR	  are	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  The	  more	  these	  two	  voices	  support	  a	  given	  project,	  the	  higher	  the	  probability	  of	  success.	  Results	  also	  show	  that	  the	  sign	  associated	  with	   the	   coefficient	   Veto-­‐D	   is	   negative	   and	   significant	   while	   the	   sign	   of	   the	   variable	  Veto-­‐I	   is	  negative	  but	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  This	  implies	  that	  a	  disagreement	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	   experts	   is	  prohibitive	  when	   the	  Députés	   recommend	   rejection	  against	   the	  preference	  of	   the	  
Intendants,	   though	   the	   reverse	   is	   not	   true.	   In	   other	  words,	   this	   suggests	   that,	   as	   a	  whole,	   the	  
Députés	  were	  more	   influential.	  Regarding	   the	  control	  variables	  Year,	  Foreigner	   and	  Luxury,	  we	  observe	  no	  effects	  except	  for	  the	  variable	  Luxury	  which	  is	  negative	  and	  significant	  in	  model	  (4),	  (7)	  and	  (8).	  This	  invalidates	  the	  common	  assumption,	  repeated	  since	  the	  time	  of	  Eli	  Heckscher	  (1931/1994),	   that	   the	   French,	   Colbertist	   version	   of	  mercantilism	  was	   strongly	   biased	   toward	  serving	  the	  demand	  of	  the	  upper	  classes.	  Identical	  effects	  are	  observed	  in	  columns	  4	  to	  6	  where	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we	   perform	   the	   same	   regressions	   while	   including	   dummy	   variables	   for	   each	   sector.	   The	  significance	  and	  the	  proportions	  of	  the	  coefficients	  remain	  stable	  and	  the	  general	  significance	  of	  the	  models	  increase	  slightly.24	  	  	  
5.2.2.	  The	  Respective	  Influences	  of	  Intendants	  and	  Députés	  
To	  assess	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  findings	  reported	  in	  Table	  7,	  we	  estimated	  Equation	  1	  by	  using	  partial	   proportional	   odds	   analysis	   (gologit,	   see	   Table	   8).	   As	   said,	   this	   regression	   procedure	  allows	  for	  more	  precision	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  results.	  The	  results	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  series	  of	  binary	  logistic	  regressions:	  i.e.	  the	  first	  panel	  contrasts	  category	  0	  (refusal)	  with	  categories	  1	  and	  2	   (restriction	   and	   approval),	  whereas	   the	   second	  panel	   contrasts	   categories	  0	   and	  1	  with	  Category	   2	   (Williams	   2006).	   A	   positive	   coefficient	   indicates	   that	   higher	   values	   of	   the	  independent	  variable	  make	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  request	  will	  be	  in	  a	  higher	  category	  of	  decision	  than	   currently,	   whereas	   a	   negative	   coefficient	   means	   that	   higher	   values	   on	   the	   independent	  variable	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  being	  in	  the	  current	  or	  a	  lower	  category	  of	  decision.	  	  
	   INSERT	  TABLE	  8	  HERE	   	  
The	   results	   in	   Table	   8	   confirm	   the	   previous	   findings:	   the	   stronger	   the	   endorsement	   of	   the	  
Intendants	   and	   the	  Députés,	   respectively,	   the	   higher	   the	   likelihood	   that	   the	   privilèges	   will	   be	  approved	   (with	   or	   without	   restrictions,	   see	   columns	   [1]	   and	   [2]).	   Column	   3,	   where	   the	  regression	  applies	  to	  the	  subsample	  in	  which	  both	  parties’	  opinions	  are	  available,	  shows	  that	  the	  stronger	   the	   support	   from	   the	   Intendants,	   the	   less	   likely	   it	   is	   that	   the	   request	  will	   be	   entirely	  rejected.	  But	  the	  reverse	  is	  not	  true:	  the	  likelihood	  of	  obtaining	  the	  entire	  package	  of	  privilèges	  does	   not	   increase.	   Conversely,	   the	   two	   positive	   and	   statistically	   significant	   coefficients	  associated	   with	   the	   variable	   DR	   indicate	   that	   support	   from	   Députés	   always	   enhances	   the	  probability	  of	  obtaining	  all	   the	  benefits	   that	  were	  requested.	  Though	  the	  small	  size	  of	   the	  sub-­‐sample	  (111	  observations)	  calls	  for	  a	  degree	  of	  caution,	  these	  results	  confirm	  the	  overall	  account	  that	  the	  Intendants	  had	  a	  lesser	  impact	  on	  final	  decisions.	  	  
In	  order	   to	  render	   these	  effects	  more	  apparent,	   the	  predicted	  probabilities	   from	  Column	  3	  are	  calculated.	   Table	   9	   indicates	   that	   when	   the	   Intendants	   recommend	   that	   the	   entire	   set	   of	  
privilèges	  be	  granted,	  the	  Bureau	  follows	  their	  advice	  in	  33.7%	  of	  cases	  and	  rejects	  the	  request	  in	  only	   5.1%	  of	   them.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	  Députés,	   these	   probabilities	   are	   respectively	   67.3%	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This effect is entirely driven by two sectors, Services and Food, for which there are very few cases 
(respectively five and six cases respectively) and a majority of same type of final decisions (83.3 % of approval 
for Food and 80% of refusal for Services). 
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0.4%.	  Finally,	  Table	  8	  confirms	  that	  applications	  for	   luxury	  products	  are	  much	  less	   likely	  to	  be	  entirely	  granted	  than	  others.25	  
	   INSERT	  TABLE	  9	  HERE	   	  
5.2.3.	  The	  Motivations	  of	  Opinions	  and	  Decisions	  
Our	   first	   batch	   of	   results	   confirmed	   that	   decisions	   at	   the	  Bureau	   are	   principally	   based	   on	   the	  opinions	  of	  Intendants	  and	  Députés,	   though	  their	  respective	  influence	  is	  unequal.	   In	  the	  second	  series	   of	   tests,	   we	   try	   to	   assess	   how	   specific	   qualitative	   arguments	   for	   or	   against	   each	  submission	  had	  a	  specific	   impact	  on	  the	  final	  decisions,	  regardless	  who	  brought	  them	  forward.	  With	  this	  view,	  we	  regress	  the	  same	  independent	  variables	  as	  previously	  (FD)	  on	  the	  arguments	  that	  are	  most	  frequently	  quoted	  in	  the	  Bureau’s	  final	  report	  (Table	  10).	  	  
We	  focus,	  in	  practice,	  on	  the	  nine	  arguments	  that	  were	  most	  often	  leveraged	  by	  the	  Bureau	  in	  its	  final	   recommendation/decision.	   TradeBalance	   takes	   the	   value	   1	   when	   the	   final	   product	   is	  deemed	   to	   allow	   for	   a	   reduction	   in	   imports	   or	   an	   increase	   in	   exports.	   The	   same	   holds	   for	  contributions	  to	  the	  local	  economy,	  technical	  innovation,	  competition	  issues,	  etc.	  (see	  Table	  A1).	  
	   INSERT	  TABLE	  10	  HERE	   	  
The	   results	   reported	   in	   Column	  1	   of	   Table	   10	   are	   straightforward:	   All	   things	   being	   equal,	   the	  
Bureau	  was	  more	  willing	  to	  grant	  privilèges	  when	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  production	  was	  considered	  or	  expected	   to	  be	  high,	  when	  the	   investment	  would	  benefit	   the	   local	  economy	  and	  consumers,	  when	   technical	   innovation	  was	  at	   stake	  and	  when	  a	  positive	  contribution	   to	   the	   trade	  balance	  was	   expected.	   Conversely,	   it	  was	   less	   prone	   to	   grant	  privilèges	  when	   the	  project	  was	   likely	   to	  distort	   competition,	   or	  when	   it	  was	   thought	   that	   the	   underlying	   technology	  was	   already	  well	  known.	  	  
The	  results	  from	  the	  gologit	  regressions	  reported	  in	  Column	  2	  offer	  more	  details	  on	  these	  policy	  preferences.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  these	  results	  easier	  to	  read,	  we	  differentiate	  between	  three	  classes	  of	  arguments,	  according	  to	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  final	  decision.	  	  
i.	  First	  are	  “Super	  Arguments”	  that	  clearly	  improve	  the	  likelihood	  of	  being	  awarded	  the	  full	  set	  of	  
privilèges	   requested.	  The	  quality	   of	   production,	   the	   contribution	   to	   the	   local	   economy	  and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 This result, however, is driven by the fact that, among the 27 requests for privilèges for luxury goods, only 5 
cases are included in the sample Both, and none of those projects was entirely granted. 
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positive	   benefits	   to	   consumers	   are	   all	   associated	   with	   positive	   and	   statistically	   significant	  coefficients,	   in	  both	  steps	  of	  the	  regression:	  the	  switch	  from	  refusal	  to	  a	  partial	  granting	  of	  the	  initial	   claim	   and	   the	   switch	   to	   a	   full	   granting.	   Note	   also	   that	   those	   coefficients	   are	   of	   higher	  magnitude	   in	   the	  Column	   “0→1;2”	   than	   in	   the	  Column	   “0;1→2”.	   This	   suggests	   that	   the	   strongest	  effect	  of	  these	  arguments	  was	  to	  avoid	  full	  rejection	  and	  guarantee	  some	  support.	  	  
ii.	  Second,	  there	  are	  “Refusal-­‐Proof	  Arguments”	  also	  offer	  a	  guarantee	  that	  full	  rejection	  will	  be	  avoided,	   though	   these	   variable	   do	   not	   predict	   whether	   all	   or	   just	   a	   fraction	   of	   the	   requested	  benefits	  will	   eventually	   be	   awarded.	   Here	  we	   have	   the	   variables	   that	   correspond	   to	   technical	  innovation,	  investment	  level,	  the	  development	  of	  local	  resources	  and	  contributions	  to	  the	  trade	  balance:	  They	  all	  significantly	  decrease	  the	  likelihood	  of	  not	  receiving	  at	  least	  some	  support.	  	  
iii.	   Lastly,	   “Approval-­‐Proof	   Arguments”	   close	   the	   door	   on	   a	   full	   package	   of	   benefits,	   but	   are	  neutral	  between	  the	  two	  lower-­‐level	  outcomes.	  Here	  we	  find	  assessments	  that	  deny	  the	  project	  any	  innovative	  character	  or	  that	  identify	  a	  possible	  negative	  impact	  on	  competition.	  The	  reading	  of	   the	  archives	   confirms	   that,	   in	  particular,	   the	  Députés	   and	   the	  members	  of	   the	  Bureau,	  were	  keen	  on	  avoiding	  distortion	  of	  competition.26	  
5.2.4.	  Who	  Raised	  Which	  Argument,	  and	  To	  What	  Effect?	  	  
The	  last	  step	  cuts	  across	  the	  discussions	  developed	  in	  the	  two	  previous	  ones:	  We	  now	  want	  to	  assess	   the	   joint	   impact	  of	   substantive	  arguments	   together	  with	   the	  voice	   that	   leveraged	   them,	  that	   is,	   either	   that	   of	   the	   Intendants	   or	   the	   Députés.	   Hence,	   we	   estimate	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  arguments	  they	  use,	  first	  on	  their	  own	  recommendations,	  and	  then	  on	  the	  final	  decision	  (Tables	  11	  and	  12).	  
	   INSERT	  TABLE	  11	  HERE	   	  	   INSERT	  TABLE	  12	  HERE	   	  
Column	  1	  of	  Table	  11	   indicates	   that	   the	  provincial	   Intendants	  were	  more	  willing	   to	   support	   a	  request	  when	  it	  was	  deemed	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  local	  consumers	  and	  the	  development	  of	  local	  resources,	  when	  the	  quality	  of	  future	  products	  was	  considered	  good	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  when	  the	  final	  product	  was	  deemed	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  reduction	  in	  imports	  or	  an	  increase	  in	  exports.	  Conversely,	   Intendants	  were	   less	   prone	   to	   support	   applications	  when	   they	   concluded	   that	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The Députés repetitively made very strong arguments against the granting of commercial exclusivity, 
especially in matters of service provision. The Bureau generally followed their recommendations. This is also 
highlighted in Beuve et al. 2013. 
26	  	  
project	  would	  distort	  competition.	  Yet,	  the	  arguments	  of	  local	  economy	  and	  competition	  are	  the	  only	  ones	  that	  still	  carry	  a	  significant	  impact	  at	  the	  final	  decision	  stage,	  i.e.,	  using	  the	  same	  vector	  of	   independent	   variables	   (on	   the	   sample	   Intendants).	   In	   other	   words,	   at	   the	   final	   stage,	   the	  influence	  of	   the	   Intendants	  was	   stronger	  when	   they	  brought	   forward	  a	  positive	   impact	   on	   the	  local	  economy	  and	  a	  negative	  argument	  for	  market	  distortion.	  A	  similar	  conclusion	  is	  obtained	  with	   the	  gologit	   estimates	   (see	  Column	  4),	   though	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   product	   also	   has	   a	   slight	  positive	  impact.	  	  
Table	  12	  also	  confirms	  these	  conclusions.	  Column	  1	  shows	  that	  the	  Députés	  were	  also	  prone	  to	  lend	   support	   to	   a	   project	   that	  was	   expected	   to	   benefit	   consumers,	   the	   local	   economy	   and	   the	  trade	  balance,	   though	  they	  also	  gave	  substantial	  weight	  to	  an	   innovative	  product	  or	  technique.	  Conversely,	  all	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  the	  Députés	  were	  reluctant	  to	  hand	  out	  privilèges	  when	  there	  were	  risks	  of	  market	  distortion	  and	  when	   they	  explicitly	  concluded	   that	   the	  project	  was	  not	  innovative.	  At	  the	  next	  step,	  when	  the	  Avis	  des	  Députés	  reached	  the	  Bureau,	  five	  substantive	  arguments	  had	  a	  significant	  statistical	  impact	  on	  the	  final	  decision,	  as	  submitted	  to	  the	  Minister:	  restriction	  of	  competition,	   import	  substitution,	  absence	  of	  innovation,	  and	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	   local	   economy	   and	   for	   consumers.	   These	   results	   are	   confirmed	   by	   the	  gologit	   regressions	  reported	   in	   columns	   3	   and	   4.	   They	   also	   show	   that	   concerns	   about	   competition	   were	   always	  highly	  detrimental,	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  request	  being	  entirely	  rejected	  by	  the	  Bureau.	  Tables	  11	  and	  12	  confirm	  again	  that	  the	  Députés’	  opinions	  had	  more	  impact	  on	  the	  final	  ruling	  than	  those	  of	  the	  Intendants.27	  	  
6.	  Conclusion	  
This	   article	   has	   explored	   how	   a	   tiny,	   eighteenth-­‐century	   French	   agency	   allocated	   rents	   to	  hundreds	  of	  private	  entrepreneurs	  over	  a	  period	  of	  more	  than	  twenty	  years	  (1724–1744).	  What	  first	   stands	   out	   is	   the	   highly	   stable	   and	   formal	   character	   of	   its	   procedures,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  willingness	  of	  bureaucrats	  to	  consult	  with	  a	   large	  array	  of	  stakeholders.	  Critically,	   this	  allowed	  them	  to	  collect	  a	  remarkably	  large	  mass	  of	  information	  and	  expert	  advice.	  The	  processing	  of	  this	  information	  and	   the	  deliberations	  among	  decision	  makers	  and	   their	  direct	  advisers	  were	   then	  organized	  within	   a	   complex	   institutional	   structure:	  Though	   the	  Bureau	  du	  Commerce	  was	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  an	  emerging,	  centralized	  and	  hierarchic	  state	  machinery,	  it	  managed	  to	  rely	  upon	  two	   colleges	   of,	   first,	   independent	   experts	   and,	   second,	   bureaucrats.	   These	   two	   high-­‐skill	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 All the estimations provided in this section were also run by using multinomial logit models and results are 
perfectly consistent. Furthermore, as an additional robustness check, we also run all the above regressions while 
varying the number of arguments included in the estimations. Results also are highly similar and the main 
identified effects are particularly stable. 
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assemblies	   successively	   discussed	   each	   case	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   available	   opinions	   and	  information,	   before	   a	   proposal	   was	   presented	   to	   the	   Minister	   as	   a	   unanimous	   position.	  With	  hindsight,	   this	   bureaucratic	   framework	   may	   thus	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   second-­‐best	   alternative	   to	   a	  
political	   mechanism	   of	   interest	   representation,	   where	   a	   Parliament	   is	   the	   place	   where	  arguments	  are	  exchanged	  and	  information	  is	  shared	  (O’Brien	  et	  al.,	  1991).	  Also,	  the	  organization	  in	  colleges	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  steps	  in	  the	  procedure	  were	  recorded	  in	  written	  documents	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  further	  guarantee	  against	  manipulation	  or	  side-­‐bargains.	  	  
In	   this	   article	  we	   have	   tested	  whether	   this	   rather	   arcane	   framework	   actually	   structured	   how	  decisions	   were	   made	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis,	   or	   whether	   in	   practice	   things	   were	   decided	  elsewhere,	  for	  instance	  at	  the	  Court	  or	  at	  the	  Opera.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  assessed	  whether	  the	  de	  
jure	   rules	   structured	   the	   observed	   decision-­‐making	   process	   and,	   in	   so	   doing,	   established	   the	  endogenous	  character	  of	  the	  decisions	  formally	  issued	  by	  the	  Bureau.	  This	  research	  strategy	  did	  not	  seek,	  therefore,	  to	  establish	  whether	  over	  time	  the	  Bureau	  remained	  faithful	  or	  not	  to	  a	  given	  policy	   mandate;	   a	   strategy	   that	   is	   commonly	   adopted	   by	   social	   scientists	   working	   on	  bureaucracies	   and	   public	   policies.	   Rather,	   we	   showed	   that	   individual	   decisions	   were	   indeed	  related	   to:	   (i)	   the	   overall	   assessment	   provided	   to	   the	   colleges	   by	   the	   two	   key	   voices	   (the	  provincial	  Intendants	  and	  the	  Députés	  );	  and	  (ii)	  the	  qualitative	  arguments	  that	  backed	  up	  their	  respective	   opinions.	   Hence,	   the	   capacity	   to	   weigh	   on	   the	   decisions	   did	   not	   reflect	   only	   one’s	  relative	   position	  within	   the	  Bureau;	   influence	   also	   derived	   from	   the	   capacity	   to	   formulate	   an	  expert	   judgment,	  based	  on	   the	   specific	   character	  of	   each	  application	  and	   the	   (revealed)	  policy	  preferences	  of	  the	  Bureau.	  Said	  differently,	  stakeholders	  had	  to	  play	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  Bureau	  if	  they	  wanted	  to	  receive	  its	  support.	  	  
We	  take	  these	  results	  as	  most	  remarkable.	  Over	  such	  a	  long	  time-­‐span,	  and	  with	  due	  regard	  for	  the	  weak	  institutional	  environment	  of	  the	  Ancien	  Régime,	  one	  should	  have	  probably	  expected	  a	  low	  level	  of	  overall	  consistency,	  reflected	  in	  inconclusive	  econometric	  results.	  Their	  robustness,	  and	   the	   detailed	   insights	   we	   have	   extracted	   on	   the	   dynamics	   of	   decision-­‐making,	   clearly	  contradict	   the	   expectations	   of	   absolute	   agency	   heteronomy,	   as	   expressed	   by	   straightforward	  public	  choice	  approaches.	  Relative	  procedural	  autonomy	  did	  not	  derive	  however	  from	  insulation	  and	   from	   hyper-­‐centralization.	   In	   spite	   of	   the	   absence	   of	   accountability	   checks	   and	   other	  constitutional	   commitments,	   this	   tiny,	   high-­‐skills,	   rule-­‐based	   agency	  was	   thus	   able	   to	   interact	  with	   a	  wide	   array	   of	   social	   and	   economic	   interests,	  without	   losing	   sight	   of	   its	   own	   long-­‐term	  policy	  goals:	  economic	  development,	  technical	  innovation,	  import-­‐substitution.	  	  
Even	  though	  we	  have	  no	  clue	  about	  its	  real	  world	  impact,	  this	  experiment	  should	  thus	  be	  seen	  primarily	  as	  a	   reflection	  of	   the	  power	  and	  virtue	  of	  bureaucratic	   formalization.	  The	  Bureau	  du	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Commerce	  did	  not	  emerge	  from	  a	  non-­‐intentional,	  path-­‐dependent	  process,	  but	  from	  an	  explicit	  attempt	  by	  the	  King’s	  policy-­‐makers	  to	  design	  a	  new	  model	  of	  agency,	  with	  a	  capacity	  to	  shape,	  or	   influence,	   the	  spontaneous	  development	  of	   the	  economy	  as	   ‘from	  the	  outside.”	  They	   looked	  explicitly	  for	  an	  instrument	  which	  would	  help	  them	  reach	  their	  core	  policy	  aim:	  economic	  catch-­‐up	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   England	   and	   the	   Netherlands.	   Moreover,	   the	   Bureau	   emerged	   in	   a	   world	   were	  accountability	  was	  not	  a	  constraint	  for	  decision	  makers.	  This	  is	  ultimately	  why	  the	  story	  of	  the	  
Bureau	   du	   Commerce	   may	   shed	   light	   more	   generally	   on	   the	   political	   attractiveness,	   in	   later	  centuries,	  of	  state-­‐led,	  technocratic	  models	  of	  economic	  development.	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Tables	  
Table	  1:	  Distribution	  of	  the	  267	  Requests	  
	  New	  venture	   60.5	  %	   Privilège	  Granted	   42.3	  %	  Intellectual	  Property	   10.2	  %	   PG	  with	  Restriction	   29.2	  %	  Renewal/Enlengthement	   12.8	  %	   Privilège	  Refused	   28.5	  %	  Extension	  of	  Scope	  /	  Redefintion	   16.5	  %	   	   	  	  
	  







	  (Intendants’	  Recommendations)	  
DR	  	  
(Députés’	  Recommendations)	  
	   Freq.	   %	   Freq.	   %	   Freq.	   %	  Refusal	  	   76	   28.5	   23	   14.7	   59	   27	  Restriction	  	   78	   29.2	   27	   19.9	   71	   31.6	  Approval	  	   113	   42.3	   91	   65.4	   93	   41.4	  Total	  	   267	   100	   136	   100	   215	   100	  
	  
	  
Table	  3.	  Correlations	  Between	  the	  Opinion	  for	  Final	  Decision	  of	  the	  Députés	  and	  Intendants	  (for	  the	  111	  cases	  
on	  which	  we	  have	  both)	  
	  	  
	   FD	   IR	   DR	  
FD	  (Final	  Decision)	   1.000	   	   	  IR	  (Intendants’	  Recommendations)	   0.573	   1.000	   	  DR	  (Députés	  Recommendations)	   0.684	   0.587	   1.000	  
	  
Table	  4.	  Distribution	  of	  the	  Opinion	  of	  Deputés	  and	  Intendants	  for	  the	  111	  Cases	  Subject	  to	  Joint	  Assessment	  
	  	  	   DR	   	  
IR	   Refusal	  Restriction	  Approval	  Total	  Refusal	   13	   1	   4	   18	  Restriction	   3	   16	   3	   22	  Approval	   2	   23	   46	   71	  Total	   18	   40	   53	   111	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Table	  5	  .Frequency	  and	  Ranking	  of	  the	  Justifications	  Put	  Forward	  by	  the	  Various	  Parties	  in	  the	  Decision	  
	   	  Rank	   Final	  Decision	  (267	  obs.)	   Request	  (267	  obs.)	   Intendants	  (136	  obs.)	   Députés	  (215	  obs.)	  1	   Quality+	   30.3	   Quality+	   36.3	   Local	  Economy+	   38.2	   Trade	  Balance	   22,3	  2	   Trade	  Balance	   27.3	   Trade	  Balance	   34.1	   Quality+	   30.1	   Consumer+	   22,3	  3	   Local	  Economy+	   24.7	   Fixed	  Costs	   26.6	   Trade	  Balance	   25.7	   Quality+	   22,3	  4	   Consumer+	   21.7	   Local	  Economy+	   21.7	   Consumer+	   23.5	   Restriction	  of	  Competition	   21,9	  5	   Fixed	  Costs	   16.5	   Technical	  Innovation	   20.2	   Development	  of	  Local	  Resources	   21.3	   Local	  Economy+	   20,0	  6	   Restriction	  of	  Competition	   13.5	   Consumer+	   19.9	   Fixed	  Costs	   17.6	   Absence	  of	  Innovation	   16,3	  7	   Technical	  Innovation	   13.1	   Development	  of	  Local	  Resources	   16.1	   Restriction	  of	  Competition	   11.0	   Technical	  Innovation	   12,1	  8	   Development	  of	  Local	  Resources	   10.9	   Social	  Employment	   14.2	   Social	  Employment	   9.6	   Fixed	  Costs	   9,3	  9	   Absence	  of	  Innovation	   10.5	   Precedents	  +	   10.5	   Attract	  Labor	  Force	   8.8	   Precedents	  -­‐	   8,4	  10	   Social	  Employment	   9.7	   Attract	  Labor	  Force	   7.5	   Prior	  Property	  Rights	  Infringement	   8.8	   Prior	  Property	  Rights	  Infringement	   8,4	  11	   Precedents	  -­‐	   7.9	   Reducing	  Fraud	   2.2	   Risk	  of	  Overproduction	   8.1	   Quality-­‐	   7,4	  12	   Prior	  Property	  Rights	  Infringement	   7.5	   Custom	  &	  Common	  Practices	  +	   1.9	   Technical	  Innovation	   7.4	   Development	  of	  Local	  Resources	   7,4	  13	   Risk	  of	  Overproduction	   7.1	   Statutes	  &	  Royal	  Decrees	  +	   1.5	   Precedents	  +	   6.6	   Risk	  of	  Overproduction	   7,4	  14	   Precedents	  +	   6.4	   Provision	  of	  Public	  Good	   0.7	   Precedents	  -­‐	   5.9	   Social	  Employment	   7,0	  15	   Attract	  Labor	  Force	   6.4	   Precedents	  -­‐	   0.4	   Fiscal	  Costs	   3.7	   Industrial	  risk	   5,1	  16	   Quality-­‐	   4.9	   Consumer-­‐	   0.4	   Quality-­‐	   2.9	   Uncertainty/Incompleteness	   4,7	  17	   Uncertainty/Incompleteness	   4.1	   Restriction	  of	  Competition	   0.4	   Difficulty	  of	  implementation	   2.2	   Precedents	  +	   3,7	  18	   Difficulty	  of	  implementation	   3.7	   Prior	  Property	  Rights	  Infringement	   0.4	   Absence	  of	  Innovation	   2.2	   Fiscal	  Costs	   3,7	  19	   Statutes	  &	  Royal	  Decrees	  -­‐	   3.4	   Custom	  &	  Common	  Practices	  -­‐	   0.0	   Custom	  &	  Common	  Practices	  +	   1.5	   Difficulty	  of	  implementation	   3,3	  20	   Fiscal	  Costs	   3.4	   Statutes	  &	  Royal	  Decrees	  -­‐	   0.0	   Industrial	  risk	   1.5	   Consumer-­‐	   2,8	  21	   Industrial	  risk	   3.0	   Local	  Economy-­‐	   0.0	   Custom	  &	  Common	  Practices	  -­‐	   0.7	   Attract	  Labor	  Force	   2,8	  22	   Reducing	  Fraud	   2.6	   Quality-­‐	   0.0	   Local	  Economy-­‐	   0.7	   Failure	  to	  deliver	   2,8	  23	   Failure	  to	  deliver	   2.2	   Industrial	  risk	   0.0	   Consumer-­‐	   0.7	   Statutes	  &	  Royal	  Decrees	  -­‐	   2,3	  24	   Statutes	  &	  Royal	  Decrees	  +	   1.9	   Difficulty	  of	  implementation	   0.0	   Provision	  of	  Public	  Good	   0.7	   Custom	  &	  Common	  Practices	  -­‐	   1,9	  25	   Consumer-­‐	   1.5	   Absence	  of	  Innovation	   0.0	   Reducing	  Fraud	   0.7	   Reducing	  Fraud	   1,9	  26	   Custom	  &	  Common	  Practices	  +	   1.1	   Risk	  of	  Overproduction	   0.0	   Fiscal	  Fairness	   0.7	   Statutes	  &	  Royal	  Decrees	  +	   1,4	  27	   Custom	  &	  Common	  Practices	  -­‐	   1.1	   Fiscal	  Costs	   0.0	   Failure	  to	  deliver	   0.7	   Local	  Economy-­‐	   0,9	  28	   Local	  Economy-­‐	   1.1	   Fiscal	  Fairness	   0.0	   Uncertainty/Incompleteness	   0.7	   Fiscal	  Fairness	   0,9	  29	   Fiscal	  Fairness	   1.1	   Failure	  to	  deliver	   0.0	   Statutes	  &	  Royal	  Decrees	  +	   0.0	   Custom	  &	  Common	  Practices	  +	   0,5	  30	   Provision	  of	  Public	  Good	   0.0	   Uncertainty/Incompleteness	   0.0	   Statutes	  &	  Royal	  Decrees	  -­‐	   0.0	   Provision	  of	  Public	  Good	   0,0	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Table	  6.	  Motivations	  for	  the	  Final	  Decision	  and	  Députés’	  and	  Intendants’	  Influence	  
	  	  
	   Request	  	  (267	  obs.)	   FD	  	  (267	  obs.)	   IR	  	  (136	  obs.)	   DR	  	  (215	  obs.)	   Diff.	  with	  	  request	   Intendants'	  influence	   Députés'	  influence	  Custom	  &	  Common	  Practices	  +	   1.9	   1.1	   1.5	   0.5	   0.7	   0.3	   -­‐0.7	  Custom	  &	  Common	  Practices	  -­‐	   0.0	   1.1	   0.7	   1.9	   -­‐1.1	   -­‐0.4	   0.7	  Precedents	  +	   10.5	   6.4	   6.6	   3.7	   4.1	   0.3	   -­‐2.6	  Precedents	  -­‐	   0.4	   7.9	   5.9	   8.4	   -­‐7.5	   -­‐2.0	   0.5	  Statutes	  &	  Royal	  Decrees	  +	   1.5	   1.9	   0.0	   1.4	   -­‐0.4	   -­‐1.9	   -­‐0.5	  Statutes	  &	  Royal	  Decrees	  -­‐	   0.0	   3.4	   0.0	   2.3	   -­‐3.4	   -­‐3.4	   -­‐1.0	  Trade	  Balance	   34.1	   27.3	   25.7	   22.3	   6.7	   -­‐1.6	   -­‐5.0	  
Local	  Economy+	   21.7	   24.7	   38.2	   20.0	   -­‐3.0	   13.5	   -­‐4.7	  Local	  Economy-­‐	   0.0	   1.1	   0.7	   0.9	   -­‐1.1	   -­‐0.4	   -­‐0.2	  Consumer+	   19.9	   21.7	   23.5	   22.3	   -­‐1.9	   1.8	   0.6	  Consumer-­‐	   0.4	   1.5	   0.7	   2.8	   -­‐1.1	   -­‐0.8	   1.3	  Technical	  Innovation	   20.2	   13.1	   7.4	   12.1	   7.1	   -­‐5.8	   -­‐1.0	  Quality+	   36.3	   30.3	   30.1	   22.3	   6.0	   -­‐0.2	   -­‐8.0	  Quality-­‐	   0.0	   4.9	   2.9	   7.4	   -­‐4.9	   -­‐1.9	   2.6	  Fixed	  Costs	   26.6	   16.5	   17.6	   9.3	   10.1	   1.2	   -­‐7.2	  Attract	  Labor	  Force	   7.5	   6.4	   8.8	   2.8	   1.1	   2.5	   -­‐3.6	  
Development	  of	  Local	  Resources	   16.1	   10.9	   21.3	   7.4	   5.2	   10.5	   -­‐3.4	  Social	  Employment	   14.2	   9.7	   9.6	   7.0	   4.5	   -­‐0.2	   -­‐2.8	  Provision	  of	  Public	  Good	   0.7	   0.0	   0.7	   0.0	   0.7	   0.7	   0.0	  Reducing	  Fraud	   2.2	   2.6	   0.7	   1.9	   -­‐0.4	   -­‐1.9	   -­‐0.8	  Industrial	  risk	   0.0	   3.0	   1.5	   5.1	   -­‐3.0	   -­‐1.5	   2.1	  Difficulty	  of	  implementation	   0.0	   3.7	   2.2	   3.3	   -­‐3.7	   -­‐1.5	   -­‐0.5	  
Restriction	  of	  Competition	   0.4	   13.5	   11.0	   21.9	   -­‐13.1	   -­‐2.5	   8.4	  
Absence	  of	  Innovation	  	   0.0	   10.5	   2.2	   16.3	   -­‐10.5	   -­‐8.3	   5.8	  Risk	  of	  Overproduction	   0.0	   7.1	   8.1	   7.4	   -­‐7.1	   1.0	   0.3	  Prior	  Property	  Rights	  Infringement	   0.4	   7.5	   8.8	   8.4	   -­‐7.1	   1.3	   0.9	  Fiscal	  Costs	   0.0	   3.4	   3.7	   3.7	   -­‐3.4	   0.3	   0.4	  Fiscal	  Fairness	   0.0	   1.1	   0.7	   0.9	   -­‐1.1	   -­‐0.4	   -­‐0.2	  Failure	  to	  deliver	   0.0	   2.2	   0.7	   2.8	   -­‐2.2	   -­‐1.5	   0.5	  Uncertainty/Incompleteness	  	   0.0	   4.1	   0.7	   4.7	   -­‐4.1	   -­‐3.4	   0.5	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Table	  7	  Final	  Decision	  and	  Recommendations:	  Ologit	  Regression	  Results	  
	  Dependent	  variable	  :	   	   Final	  Decision	  (FD)	   	  Model	  :	   	   Ordered	  logit	   	  Sample	  :	   Députés	   Intendants	   Both	   Députés	   Intendants	   Both	  	   Without	  Sector	  FE	   With	  Sector	  FE	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	   (8)	  
DR	  	   2.822***	   .	   2.050***	   .	   2.773***	   .	   1.853***	   .	  	   (0.391)	   .	   (0.443)	   .	   (0.392)	   .	   (0.475)	   .	  IR	  	   .	   2.046***	   1.043**	   .	   .	   2.232***	   1.286***	   .	  	   .	   (0.305)	   (0.322)	   .	   .	   (0.326)	   (0.344)	   .	  Veto-­‐D	   .	   .	   .	   -­‐1.474**	   .	   .	   .	   -­‐0.916+	  	   .	   .	   .	   (0.514)	   .	   .	   .	   (0.531)	  
Veto-­‐I	   .	   .	   .	   -­‐0.892	   .	   .	   .	   -­‐0.986	  
	   .	   .	   .	   (0.994)	   .	   .	   .	   (1.059)	  
Year	   0.009	   0.047	   0.029	   0.035	   0.004	   0.063	   0.043	   0.045	  	   (0.018)	   (0.035)	   (0.027)	   (0.044)	   (0.019)	   (0.041)	   (0.035)	   (0.045)	  Foreigner	   0.465	   -­‐0.367	   0.766	   0.321	   0.379	   -­‐0.588	   0.655	   0.063	  	   (0.820)	   (0.445)	   (1.021)	   (0.469)	   (0.800)	   (0.592)	   (1.041)	   (0.503)	  Luxury	   -­‐0.618	   -­‐0.480	   -­‐1.304	   -­‐1.585*	   -­‐0.763	   -­‐0.928	   -­‐1.889+	   -­‐1.724**	  	   (0.637)	   (0.493)	   (1.031)	   (0.648)	   (0.727)	   (0.639)	   (1.040)	   (0.556)	  Sector	   No	   No	   No	   	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   	  Intercept	   16.486	   82.774	   51.817	   59.384	   23.349	   110.683	   75.798	   76.722	  	   (31.069)	   (59.844)	   (47.396)	   (75.664)	   (32.753)	   (70.919)	   (59.487)	   (77.728)	  	   19.095	   85.005	   54.445	   60.918	   25.979	   113.137	   78.551	   78.363	  .	   (31.041)	   (59.787)	   (47.358)	   (75.725)	   (32.651)	   (70.868)	   (59.436)	   (77.772)	  Adjusted	  R²	   0.38	   0.22	   0.34	   0.07	   0.39	   0.40	   0.38	   0.10	  N	   215	   136	   111	   111	   215	   136	   111	   111	  In	  columns	  (1)	  and	  (5),	  the	  sample	  includes	  decisions	  for	  which	  we	  have	  access	  to	  the	  Députés’	  recommendations.	  In	  columns	  (2)	  and	  (6),	  the	  sample	  includes	  decisions	  for	  which	  we	  have	  access	  to	  the	  intendants’	  recommendations.	  Finally,	  columns	  (3),	  (4),	  (7)	  and	  (8)	  include	  decisions	  with	  both	  recommendations	  available.	  Standard	  errors,	  clustered	  at	  the	  regional	  level,	  are	  reported	  in	  parenthesis.	  ***	  p<0.001,	  **	  p<0.01,	  *	  p<0.05,	  +	  p<0.1.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Table	  8.	  Final	  Decision	  and	  Recommendations:	  Gologit	  Regression	  Results	  
	  Dependent	  variable:	   Final	  Decision	  (FD)	  Model:	   Generalized	  Ordered	  Logit	  Sample:	   Députés	   Intendants	   Both	   Both	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   0→1;2	   0;1→2	   0→1;2	   0;1→2	   0→1;2	   0;1→2	   0→1;2	   0;1→2	  
DR	  	   1.993***	   4.146***	   .	   .	   1.041**	   3.102***	   .	   .	  	   (0.374)	   (0.423)	   .	   .	   (0.398)	   (0.529)	   .	   .	  IR	  	   .	   .	   1.968***	   2.375***	   1.246**	   1.261	   .	   .	  	   .	   .	   (0.390)	   (0.479)	   (0.418)	   (0.779)	   .	   .	  Veto-­‐D	   .	   .	   .	   .	   .	   .	   -­‐0.855	   -­‐16.353***	  	   .	   .	   .	   .	   .	   .	   (0.937)	   (0.596)	  
Veto-­‐I	   .	   .	   .	   .	   .	   .	   -­‐1.171	   -­‐0.462	  	   .	   .	   .	   .	   .	   .	   (1.009)	   (0.865)	  
Year	   0.003	   0.009	   0.063	   0.052	   0.049	   0.037	   0.042	   0.042	  	   (0.018)	   (0.033)	   (0.041)	   (0.043)	   (0.039)	   (0.041)	   (0.042)	   (0.053)	  Foreigner	   0.793	   0.468	   0.014	   -­‐0.680+	   0.965	   0.734	   0.272	   0.353	  	   (0.824)	   (1.413)	   (0.745)	   (0.412)	   (1.095)	   (1.331)	   (0.797)	   (0.889)	  Luxury	   -­‐0.866	   -­‐0.704	   -­‐0.779	   -­‐1.314	   -­‐1.447	   -­‐14.874***	   -­‐1.159	   -­‐16.779***	  	   (0.869)	   (0.625)	   (0.924)	   (0.897)	   (1.400)	   (0.800)	   (1.216)	   (0.722)	  Sector	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  Intercept	   -­‐7.022	   -­‐21.922	   -­‐110.653	   -­‐95.117	   -­‐86.380	   -­‐71.655	   -­‐71.247	   -­‐73.581	  	   (31.896)	   (57.924)	   (71.072)	   (74.807)	   (67.157)	   (70.710)	   (73.104)	   (91.159)	  Adjusted	  R²	   0.43	   0.26	   0.40	   0.10	  N	   215	   136	   111	   111	  Standard	  errors,	  clustered	  at	  the	  regional	  level,	  are	  reported	  in	  parenthesis.	  ***	  p<0.001,	  **	  p<0.01,	  *	  p<0.05,	  +	  p<0.1.	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Table	  9.	  Final	  Decision	  and	  Députés’	  and	  Intendants’	  Recommendations:	  Predicted	  Probabilities	  
	  	   Predicted	  probability:	   P(FD	  =	  0)	  refusal	   P(FD	  =	  1)	  restriction	   P(FD	  =	  2)	  approval	  	   0	  (refusal)	   49,8	   23,6	   8,2	  IR	   1	  (restriction)	   45,1	   65,2	   58,1	  	   2	  (approval)	   5,1	   11,2	   33,7	  	   0	  (refusal)	   40,2	   19,2	   7,7	  DR	   1	  (restriction)	   59,4	   72,4	   25	  	   2	  (approval)	   0,4	   8,4	   67,3	  	  
Table	  10.	  Final	  Decision	  and	  its	  Motivations:	  Regression	  Results	  
	   Dependent	  variable	  :	   Final	  Decision	  (FD)	  Model	  :	   Ordered	  Logit	   Generalized	  Ordered	  Logit	  	   (1)	   (2)	  	  	   	  	   0→1;2	   0;1→2	  
Motivations:	   	   	   	  Quality+	  	   1.199***	   2.815**	   0.877*	  	   (0.363)	   (0.904)	   (0.404)	  TradeBalance.	   0.843**	   19.148***	   0.213	  	   (0.300)	   (0.619)	   (0.385)	  LocalEconomy+	   1.922***	   20.258***	   1.217***	  	   (0.310)	   (0.395)	   (0.310)	  Consumer+	   1.861***	   2.940**	   1.559***	  	   (0.415)	   (0.919)	   (0.457)	  SunkCosts	   0.679+	   17.897***	   0.375	  	   (0.382)	   (1.152)	   (0.379)	  Technic.Innovation	   1.331***	   1.760**	   0.625+	  	   (0.376)	   (0.667)	   (0.363)	  Restrict.Competition	   -­‐0.797**	   -­‐0.165	   -­‐3.153***	  	   (0.291)	   (0.454)	   (0.765)	  Val.Local.Resources	   0.836+	   18.662***	   0.590	  
	   (0.440)	   (1.159)	   (0.417)	  No.Innovation	   -­‐1.037***	   -­‐0.378	   -­‐19.574***	  
	   (0.253)	   (0.338)	   (0.450)	  Intercept	   0.536*	   -­‐1.364***	   -­‐1.672***	  	   (0.255)	   (0.345)	   (0.279)	  	   2.650***	   -­‐1.364***	   .	  	   (0.348)	   (0.345)	   .	  Controls	   Yes	   Yes	  Adj.	  R²	   0.28	   0.42	  N	   267	   267	  “Controls”	  include	  the	  variable	  Year,	  Foreigner,	  Luxury	  and	  sector	  dummies.	  Standard	  errors,	  clustered	  at	  the	  regional	  level,	  are	  reported	  in	  parenthesis.	  ***	  p<0.001,	  **	  p<0.01,	  *	  p<0.05,	  +	  p<0.1.	  	  	  	  	  
37	  	  
Table	  11.	  Intendants’	  Recommendations,	  final	  decision	  and	  Intendants’	  arguments:	  Regression	  Results	  
	  Dependent	  variable	  :	   IR	   FD	   IR	   FD	  Model	  :	   Orderd	  Logit	   Generalized	  Ordered	  Logit	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   	  	   	  	   0→1;2	   0;1→2	   0→1;2	   0;1→2	  Intendants’	  arguments	  :	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Local.Economy+	   1.255*	   0.678*	   2.862**	   1.136+	   0.686*	   0.665*	  	   (0.527)	   (0.272)	   -­‐0,447	   (0.584)	   (0.326)	   (0.314)	  Quality+	   1.851***	   0.377	   18.051***	   2.158***	   0.225	   0.364	  	   (0.480)	   (0.348)	   (1.606)	   (0.607)	   (0.681)	   (0.382)	  TradeBalance.	   1.193*	   0.238	   0.207	   1.075	   0.969	   0.046	  	   (0.592)	   (0.406)	   (1.459)	   (0.804)	   (0.745)	   (0.509)	  Consumer+	   1.877**	   0.619	   16.879***	   1.586*	   0.529	   0.589	  	   (0.677)	   (0.511)	   (0.894)	   (0.772)	   (0.667)	   (0.515)	  Val.Local.Resources	   1.703**	   0.365	   -­‐0.189	   1.944*	   0.725	   0.262	  	   (0.659)	   (0.343)	   (1.608)	   (0.762)	   (0.459)	   (0.392)	  Sunk.Costs	   -­‐0.480	   -­‐0.176	   16.237***	   -­‐0.944	   0.713	   -­‐0.405	  	   (0.632)	   (0.513)	   (1.581)	   (0.806)	   (1.031)	   (0.586)	  Restrict.Competition	   -­‐2.139***	   -­‐1.066***	   -­‐1.371**	   -­‐2.946**	   -­‐0.203	   -­‐1.960*	  	   (0.490)	   (0.293)	   (0.426)	   (0.980)	   (0.368)	   (0.788)	  Intercept	   -­‐0.683	   -­‐0.799*	   -­‐0.055	   -­‐0.602	   0.627	   -­‐0.679	  	   (0.427)	   (0.384)	   (0.409)	   (0.504)	   (0.428)	   (0.452)	  	   1.067*	   0.797+	   .	   .	   .	   .	  	  	   (0.463)	   (0.441)	   .	   .	   .	   .	  Controls	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  Adj.	  R²	   0.28	   0.06	   0.34	   0.10	  N	   136	   136	   136	   136	  “Controls”	  include	  the	  variable	  Year,	  Foreigner,	  Luxury	  and	  sector	  dummies.	  Standard	  errors,	  clustered	  at	  the	  regional	  level,	  are	  reported	  in	  parenthesis.	  	  ***	  p<0.001,	  **	  p<0.01,	  *	  p<0.05,	  +	  p<0.1.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Table	  12.	  Députés’	  Recommendations,	  Final	  Decision	  and	  Députés’	  Arguments:	  Regression	  Results	  
	  Dependent	  variable	  :	   DR	   FD	   DR	   FD	  Model	  :	   Orderd	  Logit	   Generalized	  Ordered	  Logit	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   	  	   	  	   0→1;2	   0;1→2	   0→1;2	   0;1→2	  Députés’	  arguments	  :	   	   	   	   	   	   	  TradeBalance	   0.932***	   0.951***	   2.361*	   0.503	   2.088**	   0.521+	  	   (0.267)	   (0.265)	   (1.078)	   (0.314)	   (0.669)	   (0.302)	  Consumer+	   1.545***	   0.570	   2.555*	   1.273**	   0.655+	   0.225	  	   (0.409)	   (0.379)	   (1.137)	   (0.488)	   (0.367)	   (0.377)	  Quality+	   0.783*	   0.299	   1.613*	   0.414	   0.736+	   0.151	  	   (0.364)	   (0.320)	   (0.700)	   (0.438)	   (0.441)	   (0.397)	  Restrict.Competition.	   -­‐1.599***	   -­‐1.130***	   -­‐0.869*	   -­‐17.570***	   -­‐0.761*	   -­‐2.058***	  	   (0.250)	   (0.260)	   (0.435)	   (0.371)	   (0.360)	   (0.476)	  LocalEconomy+	   1.210***	   0.319	   17.717***	   0.587	   0.728	   0,492	  	   (0.361)	   (0.333)	   (0.504)	   (0.384)	   (0.548)	   (0.471)	  No.Innovation	   -­‐2.104***	   -­‐1.033***	   -­‐1.902**	   -­‐16.936***	   -­‐0.647+	   -­‐2.900**	  	   (0.463)	   (0.277)	   (0.613)	   (0.457)	   (0.338)	   (1.092)	  Technic.Innovation	   0.759+	   0.142	   2.076***	   0.237	   0.100	   0.213	  	   (0.438)	   (0.502)	   (0.274)	   (0.454)	   (0.706)	   (0.464)	  Intercept	   -­‐0.847*	   -­‐0.688**	   0.101	   -­‐0.687+	   0.529+	   -­‐0.822*	  	   (0.366)	   (0.254)	   (0.433)	   (0.366)	   (0.301)	   (0.359)	  	   1.334**	   0.889**	   .	   .	   .	   .	  	  	   (0.444)	   (0.296)	   .	   .	   .	   .	  Controls	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  Adj.	  R²	   0.26	   0.12	   0.41	   0.19	  N	   215	   215	   215	   215	  “Controls”	  include	  the	  variable	  Year,	  Foreigner,	  Luxury	  and	  sector	  dummies.	  Standard	  errors,	  clustered	  at	  the	  regional	  level,	  are	  reported	  in	  parenthesis.	  	  ***	  p<0.001,	  **	  p<0.01,	  *	  p<0.05,	  +	  p<0.1.	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Appendix	  1	  :	  Definitions	  and	  Complementary	  Statistics	  
	  
Table	  A1.	  Variables,	  definitions	  and	  summary	  statistics	  
	  
VARIABLES	   DEFINITIONS	   SUMMARY	  STATISTICS	  
FD	  (Final	  Decision)	   Ordinal	  variable	  which	  indicates	  the	  final	  decision	  made	  by	  the	  bureau.	  Applications	  could	  be	  rejected	  (FD	  =	  0),	  could	  be	  partially	  granted	  (FD	  =	  1)	  or	  the	  entire	  set	  of	  privileges	  could	  be	  handed	  out	  (FD	  =	  2)	  
0	  :	  76	  (28.5%)	  1	  :	  78	  (29.2%)	  2	  :	  113	  (42.3%)	  N	  =	  267	  
IR	  (Intendants'	  Recommendations)	   Ordinal	  variable	  which	  indicates	  the	  recommendations	  made	  by	  the	  provincial	  Intendants	  for	  the	  final	  decision	  (same	  construction	  as	  FD	  above).	   0	  :	  20	  (14.7%)	  1	  :	  27	  	  (19.9%)	  2	  :	  89	  (65.4%)	  N	  =	  136	  
DR	  (Députés'	  Recommendations)	   Ordinal	  variable	  which	  indicates	  the	  recommendations	  made	  by	  the	  Députés	  for	  the	  final	  decision	  (same	  construction	  as	  FD	  above).	   0	  :	  58	  (27%)	  1	  :	  68	  (31.6%)	  2	  :	  89	  (41.4%)	  N	  =	  215	  
Veto-­‐I	   Dummy	  variable	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  1	  when	  the	  provincial	  Intendants	  recommend	  refusal	  while	  the	  Députés	  claim	  for	  restrictive	  or	  entire	  grant	  of	  the	  privileges.	   0	  :	  106	  (95.5%)	  1	  :	  5	  (4.5%)	  N	  =	  111	  
Veto-­‐D	   Dummy	  variable	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  1	  when	  the	  Députés	  recommend	  refusal	  while	  provincial	  Intendants	  claim	  for	  restrictive	  or	  entire	  grant	  of	  the	  privileges.	   0	  :	  106	  (95.5%)	  1	  :	  5	  (4.5%)	  N	  =	  111	  
Luxury	   Dummy	  variable	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  application	  is	  concerning	  luxury	  product.	  	   0	  :	  244	  (91.4%)	  1	  :	  23	  (8.6%)	  N	  =	  267	  
Foreigner	   Dummy	  variable	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  application	  is	  made	  by	  a	  foreign	  entrepreneur.	   0	  :	  250	  (93.6%)	  1	  :	  17	  (6.4%)	  N	  =	  267	  
Year	   Date	  of	  the	  application.	   m	  =	  1732.6	  
σ	  =	  6.1	  	  
Sector	   Sector	  of	  the	  application:	   Food	   6	  (2,1	  %)	  Faience	   22	  (7,8	  %)	  Forge	   5	  (1,8	  %)	  Machine	   18	  (6,4	  %)	  Metal	   20	  (7,1	  %)	  Mine	   13	  (4,6	  %)	  Mill	   16	  (5,7	  %)	  Small	  Manufacturing	   10	  (3,6	  %)	  Service	   5	  (1,8	  %)	  Dye	   22	  (7,8	  %)	  Textile	   108	  (38,4	  %)	  Glass	   36	  (12,8	  %)	  
Arguments	   Arguments	  put	  forward	  by	  applicants	  /	  the	  college	  of	  decision	  makers	  /	  Intendants	  /	  Députés:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	  
Custom	  &	  Common	  Practices	  +	   References	  to	  practices	  and	  factual	  situations	  which	  are	  not	  necessarily	  codified.	  
See	  Table	  6	  
Custom	  &	  Common	  Practices-­‐	   Here,	  and	  below	  for	  all,	  “-­‐“	  refers	  to	  the	  same	  argument	  used	  to	  deny	  or	  curtail	  asked	  privileges.	  
Precedents	  +	   Reference	  to	  similar	  previous	  privilèges	  granted	  to	  a	  third	  party.	  
Precedents	  -­‐	   Cf.	  above.	  
Statutes	  &	  Royal	  Decrees	  +	   Law	  and	  jurisprudence	  on	  which	  the	  applicant	  or	  council	  relies	  (outside,	  of	  course,	  the	  jurisprudence	  about	  privilèges).	  
Statutes	  &	  Royal	  Decrees	  -­‐	   Cf.	  above.	  
Trade	  Balance	   Development	  of	  production	  for	  the	  domestic	  market	  (substitution	  for	  imports)	  and	  for	  the	  development	  of	  exports.	  
Local	  Economy+	  
Arguments	  that	  insist	  on	  the	  dimension	  of	  economic	  activity	  and/or	  market	  size	  and	  demand	  support.	  The	  important	  point	  here	  is	  the	  local	  /	  regional	  character	  development.	  
Local	  Economy-­‐	   Cf.	  above.	  
Consumer+	   Explicit	  reference	  to	  the	  price	  and/or	  quality	  in	  a	  logical	  demand	  side	  and	  utility	  for	  consumers	  (usually	  local).	  
Consumer-­‐	   Cf.	  above	  
Technical	  Innovation	   Invention	  or	  import	  of	  a	  foreign	  technology	  not	  yet	  available	  in	  France.	  
Quality+	  
All	  the	  arguments	  that	  refer	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  production	  and	  unique	  know-­‐how	  that	  have	  been	  developed	  by	  the	  contractor	  and	  should	  be	  protected	  (not	  the	  technology,	  coded	  as	  “Technical	  Innovation”	  above).	  
Quality-­‐	  
All	  the	  arguments	  that	  refer	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  production	  quality	  and/or	  skills	  are	  low	  and	  no	  (or	  no	  longer)	  warrant	  protection.	  It	  is	  not	  know-­‐how	  and	  technologies	  that	  have	  become	  commonplace,	  but	  explicitly	  poor	  performance.	  
Fixed	  Costs	   Argument	  that	  refer	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  significant	  financial	  and/or	  human	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investment	  has	  been	  made	  
Attract	  Labor	  Force	   Needs	  to	  draw	  the	  workforce,	  both	  for	  local	  and	  foreign	  workforce	  (always	  for	  skilled	  workers).	  
Development	  of	  Local	  Resources	   Development	  of	  material	  and	  natural	  resources	  
Social	  Employment	  
Arguments	  that	  refer	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  population	  of	  the	  region	  in	  general	  will	  be	  better	  of	  working,	  especially	  the	  poor	  and	  hospitals	  residents.	  The	  argument	  is	  different	  from	  the	  “Local	  Economy	  +”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  absorption	  of	  underemployment	  must	  be	  explicitly	  mentioned.	  
Provision	  of	  Public	  Good	  
Arguments	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  proposed	  product/service	  corresponding	  to	  the	  application	  is	  a	  response	  to	  a	  market	  failure:	  production	  of	  “public	  infrastructure”	  /	  provision	  of	  “public	  services”.	  
Reducing	  Fraud	  
Arguments	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  proposed	  product/service	  corresponding	  to	  the	  application	  is	  a	  response	  to	  a	  regulatory	  failure	  or	  a	  failure	  of	  enforcement	  of	  standards	  (quality	  of	  production,	  taxation,	  foreign	  trade).	  This	  is	  often	  proposal	  to	  check	  the	  crossings	  (roads,	  warehouses,	  etc.).	  
Industrial	  risk	   Arguments	  put	  forward	  when	  there	  is	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  feasibility	  of	  the	  project	  or	  the	  idea	  that	  seems	  too	  risky.	  
Difficulty	  of	  implementation	   Arguments	  put	  forward	  when	  the	  privilège	  could	  not	  produce	  the	  desired	  effects	  in	  terms	  of	  support	  to	  the	  project	  and/or	  its	  enforcement	  would	  be	  problematic.	  
Restriction	  of	  Competition	  
Arguments	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  granting	  a	  privilège	  would	  give	  an	  unfair	  advantage	  to	  a	  competitor	  or	  to	  a	  distortion	  which	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  inefficient	  in	  terms	  of	  competitive	  selection	  (including	  fiscal	  distortion).	  
Absence	  of	  Innovation	   Arguments	  put	  forward	  when	  the	  knowledge	  associated	  with	  the	  application	  is	  already	  well	  known.	  
Risk	  of	  Overproduction	  
Arguments	  that	  refer	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  granting	  a	  privilège	  will	  lead	  to	  excessive	  lowering	  of	  the	  marginal	  returns	  to	  capital	  already	  invested	  or	  does	  not	  appear	  relevant	  to	  favoring	  new	  entries.	  
Prior	  Property	  Rights	  
Infringement	   Interference	  with	  prior	  property	  rights	  (i.e.	  with	  other	  privilèges).	  
Fiscal	  Costs	   Calculation	  cost	  /	  benefit	  to	  the	  State.	  
Fiscal	  Fairness	  
Arguments	  that	  refer	  to	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  it	  appears	  unfair	  to	  favor	  certain	  professions	  /	  industries	  /	  population	  compared	  to	  others.	  It	  refers	  to	  all	  cases	  where	  an	  exemption	  seems	  unjustified	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  “equality	  of	  subjects	  before	  the	  tax”.	  
Failure	  to	  deliver	   Situation	  where	  the	  privilège	  is	  explicitly	  removed	  or	  canceled	  for	  lack	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  a	  privilège	  granted	  in	  the	  past.	  
Uncertainty/Incompleteness	  
It	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  additional	  investigations	  in	  the	  case	  of	  incomplete	  information,	  but	  rather	  where	  the	  projects	  are	  too	  hazy	  and	  vague	  so	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  determine	  neither	  the	  benefits	  nor	  the	  costs	  and	  risks	  (unlike	  the	  case	  of	  projects	  identified	  as	  “too	  risky”)	  
	  
	  
Table	  A2.	  Final	  Decision	  and	  Députés’	  and	  Intendants’	  Recommendations	  	   	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  1.	  Final	  Decision	   	   	   	   	   	  2.	  Intendants'	  Recommendations	   0.57	   	   	   	   	  3.	  Députés'	  Recommendations	   0.68	   0.59	   	   	   	  4.	  Year	   0.13	   -­‐0.06	   0.16	   	   	  5.	  Foreigner	   -­‐0.07	   -­‐0.07	   -­‐0.11	   -­‐0.14	   	  6.	  Luxury	   -­‐0.17	   -­‐0.08	   -­‐0.09	   -­‐0.11	   0.48	  N	  =	  111	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Table	  A3.	  Motivations	  of	  the	  Final	  Decision	  	  
	   	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	  1.	  Final	  Decision	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  2.	  Quality+	   0.39	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  3.	  TradeBalance	   0.33	   0.38	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  4.	  LocalEconomy	   0.39	   -­‐0.04	   0.08	   	   	   	   	   	   	  5.	  Consumer+	   0.35	   0.15	   0.02	   0.14	   	   	   	   	   	  6.	  FixedCosts	   0.28	   0.34	   0.29	   0.10	   -­‐0.04	   	   	   	   	  7.	  Technic.Innov	   0.12	   0.08	   0.01	   -­‐0.15	   0.01	   -­‐0.02	   	   	   	  8.	  Restrict.Competition	   -­‐0.29	   -­‐0.17	   -­‐0.07	   -­‐0.18	   -­‐0.13	   -­‐0.18	   -­‐0.02	   	   	  9.	  Devel.LocalResources	   0.23	   0.06	   0.11	   0.33	   0.05	   0.17	   -­‐0.10	   -­‐0.07	   	  10.	  NoInnovation	   -­‐0.35	   -­‐0.20	   -­‐0.18	   -­‐0.20	   -­‐0.15	   -­‐0.15	   -­‐0.10	   0.19	   -­‐0.12	  N	  =	  267	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Table	  A4.	  Final	  Decision,	  Intendants’	  Recommendations	  and	  Intendants’	  Arguments	  
	   	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	  1.	  Final	  Decision	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  2.	  Intendants'	  Recommendations	   0.61	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  3.	  LocalEconomy	   0.20	   0.30	   	   	   	   	   	   	  4.	  Quality+	   0.09	   0.29	   -­‐0.12	   	   	   	   	   	  5.	  TradeBalance	   0.11	   0.28	   -­‐0.01	   0.38	   	   	   	   	  6.	  Consumer+	   0.13	   0.28	   0.06	   -­‐0.02	   -­‐0.05	   	   	   	  7.	  Devel.LocalResources	   0.11	   0.23	   0.29	   -­‐0.07	   0.06	   -­‐0.08	   	   	  8.	  FixedCosts	   0.05	   0.15	   0.03	   0.33	   0.30	   -­‐0.12	   0.09	   	  9.	  Restrict.Competition	   -­‐0.22	   -­‐0.40	   -­‐0.13	   -­‐0.08	   -­‐0.10	   -­‐0.14	   -­‐0.07	   -­‐0.10	  N	  =	  136	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
Table	  A5.	  Final	  Decision,	  Députés’	  Recommendations	  and	  Députés’	  Arguments	  	   	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	  1.	  Final	  Decision	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  2.	  Députés'	  Recommendations	   0.76	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  3.	  TradeBalance	   0.25	   0.25	   	   	   	   	   	   	  4.	  Consumer+	   0.17	   0.34	   -­‐0.10	   	   	   	   	   	  5.	  Quality+	   0.17	   0.26	   0.28	   0.03	   	   	   	   	  6.	  RestrictCompetition	   -­‐0.30	   -­‐0.40	   -­‐0.01	   -­‐0.18	   -­‐0.15	   	   	   	  7.	  LocalEconomy	   0.21	   0.28	   0.04	   0.23	   -­‐0.13	   -­‐0.12	   	   	  8.	  NoInnovation	   -­‐0.31	   -­‐0.46	   -­‐0.18	   -­‐0.18	   -­‐0.12	   0.16	   -­‐0.16	   	  9.	  Technic.Innovation	   0.04	   0.13	   0.08	   -­‐0.06	   0.08	   -­‐0.02	   -­‐0.15	   -­‐0.16	  N	  =	  215	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Appendix	  2:	  Archival	  Strategy	  To	  test	   the	   internal	  consistency	  of	   the	  decision-­‐making	  procedure	  at	   the	  Bureau	  du	  Commerce,	  we	  tracked	  the	  details	  of	  the	  decision	  process	  (A)	  within	  the	  archives	  of	  the	  Bureau	  (B).	  In	  order	  to	  corroborate	  our	  conclusions,	  we	  also	   looked	  outside	   the	  archives	  of	   the	  Bureau	   for	  possible	  written	  traces	  of	  undue	  external	  influence	  or	  pressure	  on	  this	  process	  (C).	  
A.	  The	  Structure	  of	  our	  database	  In	   order	   to	   explore	   how	   the	   Bureau	   du	   Commerce	   decided	   whether	   and	   how	   to	   support	  investment	  projects,	  we	  coded	  three	  types	  of	  information:	  	  i.	  The	  list	  of	  privilèges	  that	  were	  claimed	  by	  the	  entrepreneur,	  the	  relevant	  positions	  taken	  by	  the	  key	  parties	  to	  the	  decision,	  and	  the	  final	  result:	  rejection,	  full	  acceptance,	  or	  partial	  granting.	  On	  that	  basis	  we	  built	  metrics	  that	  approximate	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  packages	  of	  privilèges	  sought	  and	  granted.	  	  ii.	  The	  qualitative	  arguments	  (for	  or	  against)	  brought	  forward	  by	  each	  party,	  on	  each	  project,	  are	  also	  coded;	  this	  allows	  tracking	  how	  these	  respective	  arguments	  weighed	  in	  the	  final	  decision.	  iii.	   Additional	   variables	   are	   used	   for	   various	   controls,	   regarding	   localization	   and	   jurisdiction,	  date	  of	  entry,	  industry	  and	  characteristics	  of	  entrepreneurs.	  	  
B.	  The	  Archives	  of	  the	  Bureau	  de	  Commerce	  To	  build	  our	  database	  we	  relied	  on	  Bonnassieux	  (1900),	  who	  inventoried	  all	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	   Bureau	   between	   1700	   and	   1790.	   This	   allowed	   us	   to	   identify	   all	   decisions	   related	   to	  manufacturing,	   the	   deliberation	   dates,	   and	   the	   dates	   of	   the	  meetings	   when	   the	   decrees	   were	  reviewed.	  Our	   major	   source	   of	   information	   was	   the	   archives	   of	   the	   Bureau	   du	   Commerce	   kept	   at	   the	  
Archives	  Nationales	  (Fond	  F12).	  We	  relied	  on	  three	  types	  of	  documents.	  i.	  First	  are	  the	  minutes	  of	  the	  Bureau	  (F12	  51	  to	  91).	  They	  are	  well	  preserved	  in	  a	  codex	  format	  per	   year	   with	   an	   index.	   For	   each	   case,	   there	   are	   generally	   three	   entries:	   one	   covers	   the	  deliberation	  in	  which	  the	  claim	  is	  presented,	  together	  with	  the	  most	  salient	  arguments	  brought	  by	   the	  various	  stakeholders	  during	   the	   investigation,	  and	   the	   recommendation	   to	   the	  minister	  details	  the	  list	  of	  privilèges	  that	  should	  be	  granted	  and	  their	  justification;	  one	  covers	  the	  official	  decision	  after	  acceptance	  by	  the	  Minister;	  and	  one	  covers	   the	  written	  Arrêt,	  which	   is	   the	  exact	  draft	  of	  the	  official	  decree.	  ii.	  When	  the	  minutes	  were	  inconclusive	  we	  completed	  our	  information	  with	  papers	  archived	  by	  the	  secrétaire	  of	  the	  Bureau	  or	  its	  members	  (F12	  662-­‐670	  and	  685	  to	  704).	  This	  is	  a	  combination	  of	   the	   files	   that	   were	   managed	   by	   the	   investigators	   in	   the	   Bureau	   and	   notes	   taken	   by	   some	  participants	   in	   the	   deliberation.	   They	   are	   sorted	   by	   cases	   in	   paper	   files	   that	  may	   contain	   the	  original	  claim,	  the	  reports	  of	  the	  provincial	  Intendants	  and	  of	  the	  various	  experts,	  and	  sometimes	  a	  copy	  of	  some	  letters	  exchanged	  between	  the	  bureaucrats	  in	  Paris	  and	  various	  stakeholders	  and	  components	  of	  the	  state	  machinery.	  	  iii.	   On	   a	   systematic	   basis,	   we	   tracked	   the	   Avis	   des	   Députés	   (F12	   693	   to	   724).	   They	   provide	   a	  precise	  presentation	  of	  the	  project,	  add	  a	  cross-­‐regional	  perspective,	  and	  make	  reference	  to	  past	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decisions	   by	   the	   Bureau.	   This	   lead	   the	   deputies	   to	   qualify	   most	   of	   the	   justifications	   to	   grant	  
privilèges	  and	  to	  discuss	  in	  detail	  the	  list	  of	  privilèges	  claimed.	  Because	   these	   three	   sources	   typically	   repeat,	   at	   all	   steps,	   the	   arguments	   previously	   brought	  forward	  by	  the	  different	  parties,	  we	  have	  been	  able	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  whole	  deliberation:	  that	  is,	  the	   “career”	  of	  each	   file	   through	   the	  successive	  stages	  of	   this	  bureaucratic	  process.	  Hence,	  our	  inquiry	  can	  be	  based	  on	  the	  identification	  of:	  	  1. The	   claim	   per	   se,	   with	   the	   description	   of	   the	   project,	   the	   arguments	   that	   back	   up	   the	  demand	  for	  privilèges,	  and	  the	  list	  of	  benefits	  claimed;	  	  2. The	   report	   of	   the	  provincial	   Intendants,	  which	   includes	   the	   arguments	   and	  opinions	  of	  third	  parties,	  some	  empirical	  information,	  and	  their	  own,	  personal	  opinions;	  3. The	  Avis	  des	  Députés;	  4. The	  final,	  collective	  proposal,	  as	  submitted	  to	  the	  Minister,	  and	  the	  final	  decree;	  the	  Arrêt.	  
C.	  Possible	  Bypassing	  and	  Potential	  External	  Influences?	  To	   further	   strengthen	   our	   conclusions	   and	   buttress	   our	   key	   findings	   regarding	   the	   actual	  integrity	  of	  this	  decision	  process,	  we	  also	  looked	  outside	  the	  archives	  of	  the	  Bureau	  for	  possible	  written	  traces	  of	  undue	  influence	  or	  pressure.	  In	  the	  archives	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  (index	  G7	   at	   the	   Archives	   Nationales),	   we	   systematically	   looked	   for	   two	   possible	   biases.	   First,	   we	  checked	   that	   there	  was	   no	   alternative	   path	   to	   obtaining	   a	   Royal	  Decree	   to	   run	   a	   business	   (i).	  Second,	  we	  checked	  whether	  pressures	  were	  exercised	  on	  the	  Bureau	  (ii).	  Indeed,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	   was	   central	   to	   the	   entire	   process	   of	   granting	   privilèges	   since	   any	   decision	   with	   an	  economic	   impact	   went	   through	   it.	   Moreover	   it	   was	   the	   principal	   of	   the	   Bureau.	   If	   significant	  bypass	   of	   the	   procedure	   were	   to	   have	   occurred,	   traces	   should	   have	   been	   left	   in	   its	   very	  comprehensive	   archives	   for	   two	   main	   reasons.	   First,	   because	   the	   decision	   process	   was	   split	  between	   Paris	   and	   Versailles,	   all	   procedures	   were	   written	   and	   an	   intense	   flow	   of	  correspondence	   existed	   between	   the	   Ministry	   and	   the	   various	   components	   of	   the	   royal	  machinery.	  Second,	  games	  involving	  the	  distribution	  of	  rents	  to	  aristocrats	  or	  social	  groups	  were	  played	  in	  broad	  daylight.	  This	  was	  the	  origin	  of	  another	  intense	  flow	  of	  correspondence	  between	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  aristocrats	  or	  representatives	  of	  cities/communities	  pleading	  for	  or	  supporting	  claims	  for	  all	  kind	  or	  rents	  and	  advantages.	  	  i)	  On	   the	   first	   count,	  we	   checked	   that	   no	  decree	  was	  passed	  by	   the	  Conseil	  Royal	  des	  Finances	  regarding	  Manufactures—the	  only	  and	  supreme	  component	  of	   the	  government	  machinery	  that	  could	  enact	  such	  decision—corresponded	  to	  cases	  that	  had	  not	  been	  investigated	  by	  the	  Bureau.	  We	   therefore	   reviewed	   all	   the	   decrees	   enacted	   by	   this	   council	   from	   1724	   to	   1744	   (Projets	  
d’Arrêts	  du	  Conseil	  des	  Finances;	  G7	  1876–1886).	  We	   found	  no	   traces	  of	   any	  decrees	   related	   to	  
Manufactures	  that	  had	  not	  been	  examined	  by	  the	  Bureau	  du	  Commerce.28	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Before June 1724, all claims for privilèges de manufactures went to the Minister of Finance. He transmitted 
them to the Chair of the Bureau who distributed the task of investigating them to members of the bureaucratic 
core. The procedures then followed were the same as those in force later on concerning the internal process of 
the Bureau (i.e. consultations with experts and the Députés du Commerce and deliberations by the college of top 
bureaucrats). After June 1724, the Minister fully delegated the entire process to the Bureau. On June 21st, 1724, 
he wrote instructions to the Intendants in the provinces to ask them to transmit all information related to 
commerce directly to the Bureau. Other letters of the same type were addressed to other stakeholders. In fact, for 
about a year the Minister still managed some pending cases. From April 1725, the Arrêts related to the work 
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ii)	   To	   check	   for	   pressures	   that	   might	   have	   been	   exercised	   during	   the	   process,	   we	   first	   and	  foremost	  reviewed	  all	  the	  correspondence	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  over	  the	  period	  (G7	  31-­‐61).29	  This	   archive	   is	   constituted	   from	   drafts,	   sometimes	   copies,	   of	   the	   letters	   sent	   by	   the	  Minister.	   It	   represents	   several	   hundred	   letters	   each	   year.	   They	   are	   addressed	   to	   all	   kinds	   of	  stakeholders:	   from	   other	   ministers	   to	   individuals,	   including	   most	   the	   gears	   of	   the	   state	  machinery.	   It	   mixes	   instructions	   and	   orders	   sent	   by	   the	   Minister	   to	   its	   administration,	   and	  replies	   to	  requests	  sent	  by	   individuals—in	  the	  vast	  majority	  aristocrats—or	  representatives	  of	  communities	   and	  professions.	  This	   correspondence	   covers	   all	   subjects	   and	   comtains	   a	  precise	  record	   of	   the	   daily	   activity	   of	   this	   Ministry.	   A	   significant	   part	   of	   it	   was	   to	   administer	   the	  distribution	  of	  rents	  and	  positions	  to	  individuals.	  The	  usual	  business	  was	  for	  aristocrats	  to	  ask	  the	  Minister,	  who	  discussed	  each	  case	  face	  to	  face	  with	  the	  King,	  then	  wrote	  back	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  claimant.	   While	   there	   are	   hundreds	   of	   letters	   of	   acceptance	   or	   rejection	   for	   rents	   and	  appointments	  each	  year,	  we	  found	  only	  four	  letters	  related	  to	  Privilège	  de	  Manufacture	  over	  the	  20-­‐year	  period	  under	  investigation.	  In	  all	  these	  cases,	  the	  Minister	  replied	  that	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  influence	  a	  procedure	  that	  was	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Bureau	  du	  Commerce.	  Moreover,	  we	  did	  not	  find	  any	  letters	  from	  the	  Minister	  to	  members	  of	  the	  Bureau	  du	  Commerce	  giving	  instructions	  on	  claims	  under	   investigation.	  He	  sometimes	  transmitted	   information	  and	  asked	   for	  opinions,	  but	  never	  suggested	  decisions.	  On	   the	  contrary,	  we	   found	  some	  exchanges	  with	  other	  ministers	   in	  which	   the	   Minister	   of	   Finance	   defended	   the	   decision	   made	   by	   his	   Bureau	   in	   granting	   some	  
privilèges.	  So,	  as	  far	  as	  we	  can	  judge	  from	  this	  correspondence,	  the	  procedure	  was	  immune	  from	  significant	  pressure	  after	  it	  reached	  the	  Bureau.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
performed by the Bureau du Commerce are no longer reviewed in detail by the Conseil des Finances. We know 
from the notes of this Council, however, that the cases were mentioned in the meetings. The procedure of 
enacting the decrees is therefore fully delegated to the Bureau since then. 
29 We also checked the incoming correspondence of the Contrôleur Général.  
i. From the provincial Intendants’ (index G7 71 to 531): this fond is classified by Généralités (administrative 
jurisdictions) in chronological order. As a rule, this correspondence has been much better preserved from the 
1670s to the early 1720s than afterward. During the period under review the files appear to be much less 
systematic, though none of the thousands of letters we checked was related to a submission under review at the 
Bureau du Commerce. Thus, the instruction by the CGF of June 1724 to send all the relevant correspondence 
directly to the Bureau seems to have met with compliance. 
ii. And correspondence from private persons; The letters sent by private individuals over the period (i.e. the 
‘Correspondance to the Contrôleur Général by private persons, 1723–1735’; G7 601–602), scarcely concerns 
manufacturers. Before 1725, we see applications as they were submitted by entrepreneurs to the CGF (who then 
transmitted them to the Bureau for investigation). From that date on, all letters refer to individual demands for 
rents and specific advantages to nobles, or support to cities or communities. We also checked the requests sent to 
the CGF by individuals (i.e. the ‘Placets addressed by private persons to the Contrôleur Général’; G7 675–680) 
[680 or 693 *** Verif]. Most of them are appeals of local sentences or claims related to insolvency of royal 
officers. None of these claims concern privilèges and manufacturers. 
